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Abstract
This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible mechanisms in
environments in which the agents￿private information evolves stochastically over time and in
which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we consider are fairly
general in that the agents￿ types are allowed to evolve in a non-Markov way, decisions are
allowed to a⁄ect the type distributions and payo⁄s are not restricted to be separable over
time. Our ￿rst result is the characterization of a dynamic payo⁄ formula that describes the
evolution of the agents￿equilibrium payo⁄s in an incentive-compatible mechanism. The formula
summarizes all local ￿rst-order conditions taking into account how current information a⁄ects
the dynamics of expected payo⁄s. The formula generalizes the familiar envelope condition
from static mechanism design: the key di⁄erence is that a variation in the current types now
impacts payo⁄s in all subsequent periods both directly and through the e⁄ect on the distributions
of future types. First, we identify assumptions on the primitive environment that guarantee
that our dynamic payo⁄ formula is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility. Next, we
specialize this formula to quasi-linear environments and show how it permits one to establish
a dynamic ￿revenue-equivalence￿result and to construct a formula for dynamic virtual surplus
which is instrumental for the design of optimal mechanisms. We then turn to the characterization
of su¢ cient conditions for incentive compatibility. Lastly, we show how our results can be put to
work in a variety of applications that include the design of pro￿t-maximizing dynamic auctions
with AR(k) values and the provision of experience goods.
JEL numbers: D82, C73, L1. Keywords: dynamic mechanisms, asymmetric information, sto-
chastic processes, incentives
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Alberto.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of how to design incentive-compatible mechanisms in a dynamic environ-
ment in which agents receive private information over time and decisions may be made over time.
The model allows for serial correlation of the agents￿private information as well as the dependence
of information on past decisions. For example, it covers as special cases such problems as the
allocation of resources to agents whose valuations follow a stochastic process, the procedures for
selling new experience goods whose value is re￿ned by the buyers upon consumption, or the design
of multiperiod procurement auctions for bidders whose cost parameters evolve stochastically over
time and may exhibit learning-by-doing e⁄ects.
The fundamental di⁄erence between dynamic and static mechanism design is that in the former,
an agent has access to a lot more potential deviations. Namely, instead of a simple misrepresentation
of his true type, the agent can make this representation conditional on the information he has
observed in the mechanism, in particular on his past types, his past reports (which need not
have been truthful), and what he inferred about the other agents￿ types in the course of the
mechanism. Despite the resulting complications, we deliver some general necessary conditions
for incentive compatibility and some su¢ cient conditions, and use them to characterize pro￿t-
maximizing mechanisms in several applications.
The cornerstone of our analysis is the derivation of a formula for the derivative of an agent￿ s
expected payo⁄ in an incentive-compatible mechanism with respect to his private information.
Similarly to Mirrlees￿ s ￿rst-order approach for static environments (Mirrlees, 1971), our formula
(hereafter referred to as dynamic payo⁄ formula) provides an envelope-theorem condition sum-
marizing local incentive compatibility constraints. In contrast to the static model, however, the
derivation of this formula relies on incentive compatibility in all the future periods, not just in one
given period. Furthermore, unlike some of the earlier papers about dynamic mechanism design,
we identify conditions on the primitive environment for which the dynamic payo⁄ formula is a
necessary condition for any incentive-compatible mechanism (not just for ￿well-behaved￿ ones).
In addition to carrying over the usual static assumptions of ￿smoothness￿ of the agent￿ s payo⁄
function in his type and connectedness of the type space (see, e.g., Milgrom and Segal, 2002), the
dynamic setting requires additional assumptions on the stochastic process governing the evolution
of each agent￿ s information. Intuitively, our dynamic payo⁄ formula represents the impact of an
(in￿nitesimal) change in the agent￿ s current type on his equilibrium expected payo⁄. This change
can be decomposed into two parts. The ￿rst one is the familiar e⁄ect of the current type on the
agent￿ s expected utility, as in static mechanism design. The second part captures the indirect e⁄ect
of the current type on the expected utility through its impact on the type distributions in each of the
subsequent periods. Note that in general the current type may a⁄ect the future type distributions
1directly as well as indirectly through its impact on the type distributions in intermediate periods.
All changes in the type distributions are then evaluated by looking at their ultimate impact on
the agent￿ s utility, holding constant the agent￿ s messages to the mechanism (by the usual envelope
theorem logic).
The dynamic payo⁄formula can be established either by iterating backward the local incentive-
compatibility conditions or by using the probability integral transform theorem (see, e.g., Angus,
1994) to represent the agents￿types as the result of independent innovations (shocks). While the
two approaches lead to the same formula, the conditions on the primitive environment that validate
this formula as a necessary condition for incentive compatibility are somewhat di⁄erent. In this
sense the two approaches are complementary (see also Eso and Szentes, 2007, for a similar approach
in a two-period-one-decision model).
To ease the exposition, in the ￿rst part of the paper (Section 3) we consider an environment with
a single agent who observes all the relevant history of the mechanism. There we derive the envelope
formula that determines the agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ in a incentive-compatible mechanism. In
Section 4 we then show how to adapt the envelope formula to a multi-agent environment. The
key di⁄erence between the two settings is that in the latter an agent observes only a part of the
entire history generated by the mechanism: an agent must thus form beliefs about the unobserved
types of the other agents as well as the decisions that the mechanism has induces with these agents.
We show that the derivation for the single-agent case extends to multi-agent mechanisms provided
that the stochastic processes governing the evolution of the agents￿types are independent of one
another, except through their e⁄ect on the decisions that are observed by the agents. In other
words, we show how the familiar ￿Independent Types￿ assumption for static mechanism design
should be properly adjusted to a dynamic setting to guarantee that the agents￿equilibrium payo⁄s
can still be pinned down by an envelope formula.
For the special case of quasilinear environments, we ￿rst use the dynamic envelope formula
to establish a dynamic ￿revenue equivalence theorem￿ that links the payment rules in any two
Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms that implement the same allocation rule. In particular,
if we have a single agent who participates in a deterministic mechanism, this theorem pins down, in
each state, the total payment that is necessary to implement a given allocation rule, up to a scalar
that does not depend on the state. With many agents, or with a stochastic mechanism, the theorem
pins down the expected payments as function of each agent￿ s type history, where the expectation
is with respect to the other agents￿types and/or the stochastic decisions taken by the mechanism.
However, if one requires a strong form of ￿robustness￿ ￿ according to which the mechanism must
remain incentive-compatible even if an agent is shown at the very beginning of the game all the
other agents￿(future) types￿ then the theorem again pins down the total payments for each state.
2Next, we use the dynamic envelope formula to express the expected pro￿ts in an incentive-
compatible and individually rational mechanism as the expected ￿virtual surplus,￿appropriately
de￿ned for the dynamic setting. This derivation uses only the agents￿local incentive constraints,
and only the participation constraints of the lowest-types in the initial period. Ignoring all the
other incentive and participation constraints yields a dynamic ￿Relaxed Program,￿ which is in
general a dynamic programming problem. In particular, the Relaxed Program gives us a simple
intuition for the optimal distortions introduced by a pro￿t-maximizing principal: Since only the
￿rst-period participation constraints bind (this is due to the unlimited bonding possibilities in the
quasilinear environment with unbounded transfers), the distortions are created to balance the rent-
extraction versus e¢ ciency trade-o⁄, as perceived from the perspective of period one. However,
due to informational linkages in the stochastic type process, the principal will not only distort
the agent￿ s consumption in period one but also in any subsequent period whenever his type in
period t is informative about the ￿rst-period type. The informativeness is here measured by an
￿information index￿that captures all the direct and indirect e⁄ects of the ￿rst-period type on the
type distributions in all subsequent periods.
It turns out that when an agent￿ s type in period t > 1 hits its highest or lowest possible value, the
informational linkage disappears and the principal implements the e¢ cient level of consumption in
that period (provided that payo⁄s are additively time-separable). However, for intermediate types
in period t, the optimal mechanism entails distortions (for example, when types are positively
correlated over time in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance, and the agent￿ s payo⁄s
satisfy the single-crossing property, the optimal mechanism entails downward distortions). Thus,
in contrast to the static model, with a continuous but bounded type space, distortions in each
period t > 1 are never monotonic in the agent￿ s type. This is also in contrast with the results of
Battaglini (2005) for the case of a Markov process with only two types in each period.
Studying the Relaxed Program is not fully satisfactory unless one also provides su¢ cient con-
ditions for its solution to satisfy all of the remaining incentive and participation constraints. We
are indeed able to provide some such conditions. In particular, we show that in the case where the
agents￿types follow a Markov process and their payo⁄s are Markovian in their types (so that it
is enough to check one-stage deviations from truthtelling), a su¢ cient condition for an allocation
rule to be implementable is that the partial derivative of the agent￿ s expected utility with respect
to his current type when he misreports be nondecreasing in the report. One can then use the
dynamic payo⁄ formula to calculate this partial derivative￿ the condition is fairly easy to check.
(Unfortunately, this condition is not necessary for incentive-compatibility￿ a tight characterization
is evasive because of the multidimensional decision space of the problem.) This su¢ cient condi-
tion also turns useful when checking incentive compatibility is some non-Markov settings that are
3su¢ ciently ￿separable.￿
In some standard settings we can actually state an even simpler su¢ cient condition for incentive
compatibility, which also ensures that incentive compatibility is robust to an agent learning in
advance all of the other agents￿types (and therefore to any weaker form of information leakage in
the mechanism). This condition is that the transitions that describe the evolution of the agents￿
private information are monotone in the sense of First-Order Dominance, the payo⁄s satisfy a single-
crossing property, and the allocation rule is ￿strongly monotonic￿in the sense that the consumption
of a given agent in any period is nondecreasing in each of the agent￿ s type reports, for any given
pro￿le of reports by the other agents.
In Section 5, we apply the general results to a few simple, yet illuminating, applications. The
analysis proves especially simple when the agents￿types follow an autoregressive stochastic process
of degree k (AR(k)). If we assume in addition that each agent￿ s payo⁄ is a¢ ne in his types
(but not necessarily in his consumption), then the principal￿ s Relaxed Program turns out to be
very similar to the expected social surplus maximization program, the only di⁄erence being that
the agents￿true values in each period are replaced by their corresponding ￿virtual values.￿ In
the AR(k) case, the di⁄erence between an agent￿ s true value and his virtual value in period t,
which can be called his ￿handicap￿ in period t, is determined by the agent￿ s ￿rst-period type,
the hazard rate of the ￿rst period type￿ s distribution, and the ￿impulse response coe¢ cient￿ of
the AR(k) process.1 Intuitively, the impulse response coe¢ cient determines the informational link
between period t and period 1, while the ￿rst-period hazard rate captures the importance that the
principal assigns to the trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and rent-extraction as perceived from period
one￿ s perspective (just as in the static model). Importantly, since the handicaps depend only on
the ￿rst-period type reports, the Relaxed Program at any period t ￿ 2 can be solved by running
an e¢ cient (i.e., expected surplus-maximizing) mechanism on the handicapped values. Thus, while
building an e¢ cient mechanism may in general require solving an involved dynamic programming
problem (due to possible intertemporal payo⁄interactions), once a solution is found it can be easily
adapted to obtain a solution to the Relaxed Program. We also use the fact that the solution to the
Relaxed Program looks ￿quasi-e¢ cient￿from period 2 onward to show that it can be implemented
in a mechanism that is incentive compatible from period 2 onward (following truthtelling in period
one). This can be done for example using the ￿Team Mechanism￿payments proposed by Athey
and Segal (2007) to implement e¢ cient allocation rules. As for verifying incentives in period 1, we
have only been able to do it in a few special settings.
We also consider two other applications. The ￿rst one is the designing of sequential auctions
for environments in which the agents￿payo⁄s are time-separable while their private types follow an
1The term ￿handicapped auction￿was ￿rst used in Eso and Szentes (2007).
4AR(k) process. This setting is particularly simple because the Relaxed Program separates across
periods and states and so we do not need to solve a dynamic programming problem. Under the
standard monotone hazard rate assumption on the agents￿initial type distribution and the standard
third-derivative assumption on their utility functions, the Relaxed Program is solved by a Strongly
Monotone allocation rule, which then implies that it is implementable in an incentive-compatible
mechanism (and one that is robust to information leakage). The optimal mechanism exhibits some
interesting properties: for example, an agent￿ s consumption in a given period depends only on his
initial report and his current report, but not on intermediate reports. This can be interpreted as a
scheme where the agents make up-front payments that reduce their future distortions.
The second application is one in which an agent receives a signal about his unknown valuation
for a new good each time he consumes it. The agent￿ s expected value for the good then follows a
martingale. The solution to the e¢ cient dynamic programming problem in this setting takes the
form of a stopping rule. The solution to the pro￿t-maximization problem looks similar, except
that the agent again makes a ￿rst-period report that determines his up-front payment and his
subsequent handicaps. This optimal mechanism achieves a strictly higher expected pro￿t than any
pricing policy, even a history-contingent one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
presents the results for the single-agent case. Section 4 extends the analysis to quasi-linear settings
with multiple agents. Section 5 presents a few applications. The Appendix at the end of the
manuscript presents all proofs omitted in the main text.
2 Related Literature2
The last few years have witnessed a fast-growing literature on dynamic mechanism design. A num-
ber of recent papers propose mechanisms for implementing e¢ cient (welfare-maximizing) mecha-
nisms that are the dynamic analogues of static VCG and expected-externality mechanisms (see, for
example, Athey and Segal (2007) and Bergemann and V￿lim￿ki (2007), and the references therein).
These papers do not provide a general analysis of incentive compatibility in dynamic setting, but
simply identify some mechanisms that turn out to be incentive-compatible.
Our analysis is more closely related to the pioneering work of Baron and Besanko (1984) on
regulation of a natural monopoly and the more recent paper of Courty and Li (2000) on advance
ticket sales. Both papers consider a two-period model with one agent and use the ￿rst-order
approach to derive optimal mechanisms. The agent￿ s types in the two periods are serially correlated
2This section is still very much incomplete. We apologize to those authors who feel that their work should have
been discussed and that we omitted here.
5and this correlation determines the distortions in the optimal mechanism. Courty and Li also
provide some su¢ cient conditions for the allocation rule to be implementable. Our paper builds on
the ideas in these papers but extends the approach to allow for multiple periods, multiple agents,
and for more general speci￿cation of the payo⁄ and information structure. Contrary to these
early papers, we also provide conditions on the primitive environment that validate the ￿￿rst-order
approach.￿
Related is also a more recent paper by Battaglini (2005) who considers a model with one
agent and two types and derives an optimal selling mechanism for a monopolist facing a consumer
whose type follows a Markov process. Our results for a model with continuous types indicate that
many of his predictions seem speci￿c to the special setting with only two types. We discuss in
more detail the di⁄erences between the results in the two papers in subsection 4.6.3 Gershkov
and Moldovanu (2008a) and Gershkov and Moldovanu (2008b) consider both e¢ cient and pro￿t
maximizing mechanisms to allocate a ￿xed set of objects to buyers that arrive randomly over time.
While the model has multiple agents, they assume that each agent lives only instantaneously. Hence
the problem that each agent faces is actually static. The paper derives a payo⁄-equivalence result
which is essentially a static payo⁄ equivalence result applied separately to each short-lived agent.
In contrast, we allow the agents to be long-lived.4
Eso and Szentes (2007) consider a two-period model with many agents but with a single decision
in the second period. They propose a di⁄erent approach than that in Baron and Besanko (1984)
and Courty and Li (2000) to the characterization of optimal mechanisms. Their approach consists
in using the Probability Integral Transform Theorem to represent an agent￿ s second-period type as
a function of his ￿rst-period type and a random shock that is independent of the ￿rst-period type.
In Section 3.3 we show how the Probability Integral Transform Theorem can be used recursively
in a setting with possibly in￿nite periods to describe the entire stochastic process that governs
the evolution of the agents￿private information by means of serially independent shocks. We then
show how the independent-shock representation can be used to derive our dynamic payo⁄ formula
under a somewhat di⁄erent set of assumptions. Eso and Szentes also derive a pro￿t-maximizing
auction and coin the term ￿handicapped auction￿ to describe it. However, in their two-period
AR(1) setting, it turns out that any incentive-compatible mechanism, not just a pro￿t-maximizing
one, can be viewed as a ￿handicapped auction.￿What we ￿nd more surprising is that under the
special assumptions of an AR(k) type process and a¢ ne payo⁄s, then even with many periods
the optimal mechanism remains an ￿handicapped mechanism.￿The distinguishing feature of such
3See also our companion paper Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2008) for a further discussion.
4Other recent papers that study dynamic pro￿t-maximizing mechanisms include Bognar, Borgers, and Meyer-ter
Vehn (2008) and Zhang (2008). The key di⁄erence between these papers and ours is that these papers look at
particular issues that can emerge in dynamic environments, such as costly participation, while our abstracts from
some of these issues but instead provides a more general characterization of incentive-compatibility.
6mechanisms is that the allocation in a given period depends only on that period￿ s reports and the
reports in the ￿rst period; it is thus independent of the reports in all intermediate periods.5
The paper is also related to a more ￿macro-ish￿literature on dynamic optimal taxation. While
the early literature typically assumes i.i.d. shocks (e.g. Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990),
Atkeson and Lucas (1992)), the more recent literature considers the case of persistent private
information (e.g. Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003),
Kocherlakota (2005), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), Kapicka (2006), Tchistyi (2006), Biais, Mari-
otti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), Zhang (2006), Williams (2008)). While our work shares several
modelling assumptions with some of the papers in this literature, its key distinctive aspect is the
general characterization of incentive compatibility as opposed to the features of the optimal mech-
anism in the contest of speci￿c applications.6
Dynamic mechanism design is also inherently related to the literature on multidimensional
screening, as noted, e.g., in Rochet and Stole (2003). Indeed, it is the multidimensional nature
of the problem that prevents a complete characterization of all implementable allocation rules.
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which incentive compatibility is much easier to ensure in a dynamic
mechanism than in a static multidimensional mechanism. This is because in a dynamic environment
an agent is asked to report each dimension of his private information before learning the subsequent
dimensions. By implication there are fewer deviations than in the corresponding static environment
in which the agents observe all the dimensions at once. Because of this, the set of allocation
rules that are implementable in a dynamic environment proves to be signi￿cantly larger than
the set of allocation rules that are implementable in the corresponding static multidimensional
environment. For example, the pro￿t-maximizing dynamic allocation rules we characterize are
typically not implementable if the agents were to observe all of their private information at the
outset of the mechanism.
We also touch here upon the issue of transparency in mechanisms. Calzolari and Pavan (2006a)
and Calzolari and Pavan (2006b) study its role in environments in which downstream actions (e.g.
resale o⁄ers in secondary markets, or more generally contract o⁄ers in sequential common agency)
are not contractible upstream. Pancs (2007) also studies the role of transparency in environments
where agents take nonenforceable actions such as investment or information acquisition.
5Another key di⁄erence between the two papers is that, while Eso and Szentes use their model to study primarily
the e⁄ects of the seller￿ s information disclosures on surplus extraction, here we focus on the characterization of
incentive compatibility in general dynamic mechanisms. For this purpose, it is essential to allow for non-Markov
processes and non-time-separable preferences, and to permit decisions to a⁄ect the type distributions.
6Some of the works in this literature limit the analysis to the characterization of local ￿rst-order conditions (e.g.
the inverse Euler equation) and either leave the dynamics of the optimal mechanism unspeci￿ed or they solve it
numerically.
73 Single-agent case
3.1 General setup
3.1.1 The Environment
We consider an environment with one agent and ￿nitely many periods, indexed by t = 1;2;:::;T.
In each period t there is a contractible decision yt 2 Yt, whose outcome is observed by the agent.
(In the next section we apply the model to a more general setup where yt is the part of the decision
taken in period t that is observed by the agent.) Each Yt is assumed to be a measurable space with
the sigma-algebra left implicit. The set of all period-t decision histories is denoted Y t ￿
Qt
￿=1 Y￿.7
For the full histories we drop the superscripts so that y is an element of Y ￿ Y T.
Before the period-t decision is taken, the agent receives some private information ￿t 2 ￿t ￿ R.
We implicitly endow the set ￿t with the Borel sigma-algebra. We refer to ￿t as the agent￿ s current
type. The set of all possible type histories at period t is then denoted by ￿t ￿
Qt
￿=1 ￿￿. An element
￿ of ￿ ￿ ￿T is referred to as the agent￿ s type.
The distribution of the current type ￿t may depend on the entire history of types and decisions
(￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1. In particular, we assume that the distribution of ￿t is governed by a
history-dependent probability measure (￿kernel￿ ) Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
on ￿t such that Ft (Aj￿) : ￿t￿1￿
Y t￿1 ! R is measurable for all measurable A ￿ ￿t.8 Note that the distribution of ￿t depends only
on variables observed by the agent. We denote the collection of kernels by
F ￿
￿
Ft : ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(￿t)
￿T
t=1 ;
where for any measurable set A, ￿(A) denotes the set of probability measures on A. We abuse nota-
tion by using Ft(￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) to denote the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) corresponding
to the measure Ft(￿t￿1;yt￿1).
The agent is a von Neumann-Morgenstern decision maker whose preferences over lotteries over
￿ ￿ Y are represented by the expectation of a (measurable) Bernoulli utility function
U : ￿ ￿ Y ! R:
(Although some form of time separability of U is typically assumed in applications, it is not needed
for the general results.)
An often encountered special case in applications is one where private information evolves in a
7By convention, all products of measurable spaces encountered in the text are endowed with the product sigma-
algebra.
8Throughout, we adopt the convention that for any set A, A
0 ￿ f?g.
8Markovian fashion, and where the agent￿ s payo⁄ is Markovian in the following sense.
De￿nition 1 The environment is Markov if
1. for all t, and all (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1, Ft(￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) does not depend on ￿t￿2, and
2. there exists functions
￿
At : ￿t ￿ Y t ! R++
￿T￿1
t=1 and
￿
Bt : ￿t ￿ Y t ! R
￿T
t=1 such that for all
(￿;y) 2 ￿ ￿ Y ,
U (￿;y) =
T X
t=1
 
t￿1 Y
￿=1
A￿ (￿￿;y￿)
!
Bt
￿
￿t;yt￿
: (1)
Condition (1) guarantees that the stochastic process governing the evolution of the agent￿ s type
is Markov, while Condition (2) ensures that in any given period t, after observing history
￿
￿t;yt￿1￿
,
the agent￿ s von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over future lotteries depend on his type history
￿t only through the current type ￿t. In particular, it encompasses the case of additive separable
preferences (At
￿
￿t;yt￿
= 1 for all t) as well as the case of multiplicative separable preferences
(Bt
￿
￿t;yt￿
= 0 for all t < T).
3.1.2 Mechanisms
A mechanism in the above environment assigns a set of possible messages to the agent in each
period. The agent sends a message from this set and the mechanism responds with a (possibly
randomized) decision that may depend on the entire history of messages sent up to period t, and
on past decisions. By the Revelation Principle (adapted from Myerson, 1986), for any standard
solution concept, any distribution on ￿￿Y that can be induced as an equilibrium outcome in any
mechanism can be induced as an equilibrium outcome of a ￿direct mechanism￿in which the agent
is asked to report the current type in each period, and in equilibrium he reports truthfully.
Let mt 2 ￿t denote the agent￿ s period-t message, and let mt ￿ (m1;:::mt).
De￿nition 2 A direct mechanism is a collection
￿ ￿
￿
￿t : ￿t ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(Yt)
￿T
t=1
such that for all t, and all measurable A ￿ Yt, ￿t(Aj￿) : ￿t ￿ Y t￿1 ! [0;1] is measurable.
(The notation ￿t(Ajmt;yt￿1) stands for the probability of the mechanism generating yt 2 A ￿ Yt
given history (mt;yt￿1) 2 ￿t ￿ Y t￿1.)
Given a direct mechanism ￿, and a history (￿t￿1;mt￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1￿￿t￿1￿Y t￿1, the following
sequence of events takes place in each period t:
91. The agent privately observes his current type ￿t 2 ￿t drawn according to Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
.
2. The agent sends a message mt 2 ￿t.
3. The mechanism selects a decision yt 2 Yt according to ￿t(￿jmt;yt￿1).
A (pure) strategy for the agent in a direct mechanism is thus a collection of measurable functions
￿ ￿
￿
￿t : ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿t
￿T
t=1 :
De￿nition 3 A strategy ￿ is truthful if for all t and all ((￿t￿1;￿t);mt￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿￿t￿1￿Y t￿1,
￿t((￿t￿1;￿t);mt￿1;yt￿1) = ￿t:
This de￿nition de￿nes a unique strategy that requires the agent to report his current type
truthfully following all histories, including non-truthful ones.
In order to describe expected payo⁄s, it is convenient to develop some more notation. First we
de￿ne histories. For all t = 0;1;:::;T, let
Ht ￿
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1￿
[
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ Y t￿1￿
[
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ Y t￿
;
where by convention H0 = f?g, and H1 = ￿1 [(￿1 ￿ ￿1)[(￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ Y1). Then Ht is the set of
all histories terminating within period t, and, accordingly, any h 2 Ht is referred to as a period-t
history. We let
H ￿
T [
t=0
Ht
denote the set of all histories. A history (￿s;mt;yu) 2 H is a successor to history (^ ￿
j
; ^ mk; ^ yl) 2 H
if (1) (s;t;u) ￿ (j;k;l), and (2) (￿j;mk;yl) = (^ ￿
j
; ^ mk; ^ yl). A history h = (￿s;mt;yu) 2 H is a
truthful history if ￿t = mt.
Fix a direct mechanism ￿, a strategy ￿, and a history h 2 H. Let ￿[￿;￿]jh denote the (unique)
probability measure on ￿￿￿￿Y ￿ the product space of types, messages, and decisions￿ induced
by assuming that following history h in mechanism ￿, the agent follows strategy ￿ in the future.
More precisely, let h = (￿s;mt;yu). Then ￿[￿;￿]jh assigns probability one to (~ ￿; ~ m; ~ y) such that
(~ ￿
s
; ~ mt; ~ yu) = (￿s;mt;yu). Its behavior on ￿￿￿￿Y is otherwise induced by the stochastic process
that starts in period s with history h, and whose transitions are determined by the strategy ￿,
mechanism ￿, and kernels F. If h is the null history we then simply write ￿[￿;￿]. We also adopt
the convention of omitting ￿ from the arguments of ￿ when ￿ is the truthful strategy. Thus ￿[￿]
10is the ex-ante measure induced by truthtelling while ￿[￿]jh is the measure induced by the truthful
strategy following history h.
Given this notation, we write the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ when following history h he plays
according to strategy ￿ in the future as E￿[￿;￿]jh[U(~ ￿; ~ y)].9
For most of the results we use ex-ante rationality as our solution concept. That is, we require
the agent￿ s strategy to be optimal when evaluated at date zero, before learning ￿1. In a direct
mechanism this corresponds to ex-ante incentive compatibility de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 4 A direct mechanism ￿ is ex-ante incentive compatible (ex-ante IC) if for all strategies
￿,10
E￿[￿][U(~ ￿; ~ y)] ￿ E￿[￿;￿][U(~ ￿; ~ y)]:
This notion of IC is arguably the weakest for a dynamic environment. Thus deriving necessary
conditions for this notion gives the strongest results. However, for certain results it is convenient
to de￿ne IC at a given history.
De￿nition 5 Given a direct mechanism ￿, the agent￿ s value function is a mapping V ￿ : H ! R
such that for all h 2 H,
V ￿(h) = sup
￿
E￿[￿;￿]jh[U(~ ￿; ~ y)]:
De￿nition 6 Let h 2 H. A direct mechanism ￿ is incentive compatible at history h (IC at h) if
E￿[￿]jh[U(~ ￿; ~ y)] = V ￿(h):
In words, ￿ is IC at h if truthful reporting in the future maximizes the agent￿ s expected
continuation payo⁄ following history h. This de￿nition is ￿ exible in that it allows us to generate
di⁄erent notions of IC as special cases by requiring IC at all histories in a particular subset. For
example, ex-ante IC is equivalent to requiring IC only at the null history. Or in a static model (i.e.,
if T = 1), the standard de￿nition of interim incentive compatibility obtains by requiring ￿ to be IC
at all histories where the agent knows only his type. In a dynamic model a natural alternative is
to require that if the agent has been truthful in the past, he ￿nds it optimal to continue to report
truthfully. This is obtained by requiring ￿ to be IC at all truthful histories.
The Principle of Optimality implies the following lemma.
9Throughout we use ￿tildes￿to denote random variables with the same symbol without the tilde corresponding
to a particular realization.
10Restricting attention to pure strategies is without loss: By the Revelation Principle the agent can be assumed
to follow the truthful pure strategy in equilibrium. As for deviations, a mixed strategy (or a collection of behavioral
strategies) induces a lottery over payo⁄s from pure strategies. Thus, if there is a pro￿table deviation to a mixed
strategy, then there is also a pro￿table deviation to a pure strategy in the support of the mixed strategy.
11Lemma 1 If ￿ is IC at h, then for ￿[￿]jh-almost all successors h0 to h, ￿ is IC at h0.
In particular, if ￿ is ex-ante IC , then truthtelling is also sequentially optimal at truthful future
histories h with probability one, and the agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ at such histories is given by
V ￿(h) with probability one. We will sometimes ￿nd it convenient to focus on such histories, and
they are the only ones that matter for ex-ante expectations.
3.2 Necessary Conditions for IC: Backward-Induction Approach
We now set out to derive a recursive formula for (the derivative of) the agent￿ s expected payo⁄
in an incentive compatible mechanism. This formula extends to dynamic models the standard use
of the envelope theorem in static models to pin down the dependence of the agent￿ s equilibrium
utility on his true type (see, e.g., Milgrom and Segal, 2002). We begin with a heuristic derivation
of the result. First recall the standard approach with T = 1, which expresses the derivative of the
agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ in an IC mechanism with respect to his type as the partial derivative of
his utility function with respect to the true type holding the truthful equilibrium message ￿xed:
dV ￿(￿1)
d￿1
=
Z
Y1
@U (￿1;y1)
@￿1
d￿1(y1j￿1) = E￿[￿]j￿1
2
4
@U
￿
~ ￿1; ~ y1
￿
@￿1
3
5:
(For the moment we ignore the precise conditions for the argument to be valid).
With T > 1, we may be interested in evaluating the equilibrium payo⁄ starting from any
period t. In general, the agent￿ s continuation utility from truthtelling following a truthful history
h = (￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1) is
E￿[￿]jh
h
U
￿
~ ￿; ~ y
￿i
=
Z
U (￿;y)dFT+1
￿
￿T+1j￿T;yT￿
d￿T
￿
yTjmT;yT￿1￿
￿￿￿dFt+1
￿
￿t+1j￿t;yt￿
d￿t
￿
ytjmt;yt￿1￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
m=￿
;
where dFT+1(￿T+1j￿T;yT) ￿ 1. Assume for the moment that this expression is su¢ ciently well-
behaved so that the derivatives encountered below exist. Suppose one now replicates the argument
from the static case. That is, consider the agent￿ s problem of choosing a continuation strategy given
the truthful history (￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1). Assuming that an envelope argument applies, we di⁄erentiate
with respect to the agent￿ s current type ￿t holding the agent￿ s truthful future messages ￿xed. The
current type directly enters the payo⁄ in two ways. First, it enters the agent￿ s utility function
U. This gives the term E￿[￿]jh[@U(~ ￿; ~ y)=@￿t]. Second, it enters the kernels F. This gives (after
12integrating by parts and di⁄erentiating within the integral) for each ￿ > t the term
￿E￿[￿]jh
"Z
@F￿(￿￿j~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1)
@￿t
@V ￿((~ ￿
￿￿1
;￿￿);~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1)
@￿￿
d￿￿
#
:
This suggests that a marginal change in the current type e⁄ects the equilibrium payo⁄ through
two di⁄erent channels. First, it changes the agent￿ s payo⁄ from any allocation. Second, it changes
the distribution of future types in all periods ￿ > t, and hence leads to a change in the period-￿
continuation utility captured by the derivative of the value function V ￿ evaluated at the appropriate
history.
While the above heuristic derivation isolates the e⁄ects of the current type on the agent￿ s
equilibrium payo⁄, it does not address the technical conditions for the derivation to be valid. In fact,
in general the derivatives of the future value function can not be assumed to exist so that the actual
formal argument is more involved. In particular, we do not want to impose any restriction on the
mechanism ￿ to guarantee di⁄erentiability of the value function. This would clearly be restrictive,
for example, for the purposes of deriving implications for optimal mechanisms. Instead, we seek
to identify properties of the environment that guarantee that the value function is su¢ ciently well
behaved.
Our derivation makes use of the following key assumptions.
Assumption 1 For all t, ￿t = (￿t;￿t) ￿ R for some ￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ +1.
Assumption 2 For all t, and all (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1,
R
j￿tjdFt(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1) < +1.
Assumption 3 For all t, and all (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1, the c.d.f. Ft(￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) is strictly
increasing on ￿t.
Assumption 4 For all t, and all (￿;y) 2 ￿ ￿ Y , @U(￿;y)=@￿t exists and is bounded uniformly in
(￿;y).
Assumption 5 For all t, all ￿ < t, and all (￿t;yt￿1) 2 ￿t ￿ Y t￿1, @Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)=@￿￿ exists.
Furthermore, for all t, there exists an integrable function Bt : ￿t ! R+ [ f+1g such that for all
￿ < t, and all (￿t;yt￿1) 2 ￿t ￿ Y t￿1,
￿ ￿@Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)=@￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ Bt(￿t):
Assumption 6 For all t, and all yt￿1 2 Y t￿1, the probability measure Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
is continu-
ous in ￿t￿1 in the total variation metric.11
11See, e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989) for the de￿nition of the total variation metric.
13Assumptions 1 and 4 are familiar from static settings (see, e.g., Milgrom and Segal, 2002).
Note, however, that we do not require that the set of types be bounded. Assumptions 2 and 3
are also typically made in static models. Assumption 2 about the existence of the expectation is
trivially satis￿ed if ￿t is bounded. Assumption 3 is a full support assumption, which is related
to Assumption 1. While Assumption 1 requires that the set ￿t of all feasible types be connected,
Assumption 3 implies that the set of relevant types is a connected set.12
Assumption 5 requires that the distribution of the current type depend su¢ ciently smoothly on
past types. The motivation for it is essentially the same as for requiring that, even in static settings,
utility depends smoothly on types (i.e., Assumption 4). In a dynamic model the agent￿ s expected
payo⁄ depends on his true type both through the utility function U and the kernels F. For the
expected payo⁄to depend smoothly on types, both U and F need to have this property.13 Since this
assumption does not have an immediate counterpart in the static model, it is instructive to consider
what restrictions it imposes on the stochastic process for ￿t. In particular, it implies that the partial
derivative of the expected current type with respect to any past type ￿￿, @
@￿￿ E[￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1], exists
and is bounded uniformly in (￿t￿1;yt￿1)￿ see Lemma A1 in the Appendix.
It turns out that for non-Markov models Assumption 5 by itself does not impose enough reg-
ularity on the dependence of the kernels on past types, and hence we impose also Assumption
6.
We are now ready to state our ￿rst main result.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1-6 hold. (In the Markov case, Assumption 6 can be dis-
pensed with.) If ￿ is IC at the truthful history ht￿1 ￿
￿
￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
, then
V ￿(￿t;ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿t, and for a.e. ￿t,
@V ￿(￿t;ht￿1)
@￿t
=
E￿[￿]j(￿t;ht￿1)
"
@U(~ ￿; ~ y)
@￿t
￿
T X
￿=t+1
Z
@F￿(￿￿j~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1)
@￿t
@V ￿((~ ￿
￿￿1
;￿￿);~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1)
@￿￿
d￿￿
#
:
(IC-FOC)
The recursive formula (IC-FOC) pins down how the agent￿ s equilibrium utility varies as a
function of the current type ￿t. It is a dynamic generalization of the static envelope theorem
formula sometimes referred to as the ￿Mirrlees￿ s trick￿ (Mirrlees, 1971). (Of course, the static
result obtains as a special case when T = t = 1.) As suggested in the heuristic derivation preceding
12Depending on the notion of IC used, full support may not be needed as long as IC is imposed for all types in
￿t. However, without it, the interpretation becomes an issue. For example, consider a static model where ￿1 = [0;1]
but where F assigns probability one to the set f0;1g. Is this a model with a continuous type space in which IC is
imposed for all ￿1 2 [0;1], or a model with two types with IC imposed only on ￿1 2 f0;1g?
13This presumes the assumptions have to be stated separately for the primitives U and F. A weaker joint (or
￿reduced form￿ ) assumption imposing restrictions directly on the expected payo⁄ would su¢ ce.
14the result, an in￿nitesimal change in the current type has two kinds of e⁄ects in a dynamic model.
First, there is a direct e⁄ect on the ￿nal utility from decisions, which is captured by the partial
derivative of U with respect to ￿t. This is the only e⁄ect present in static models. With more
than one period, there is a second, indirect, e⁄ect through the impact of the current type on the
distribution of future types. This is captured by the sum within the expectation. The e⁄ect of the
current type ￿t on the distribution of period ￿ type is captured by the partial derivative of F￿ with
respect to ￿t. The induced change in utility is evaluated by considering the partial derivative of
the period ￿ value function V￿ with respect to ￿￿.
Remark 1 We have assumed that the information the agent receives in each period (his current
type) is one-dimensional. If in a given period the agent￿ s current type were multidimensional, we
could still derive the same necessary condition (IC-FOC) for incentive compatibility by restricting
the agent to observing each dimension of his current type at a time and reporting each dimension
before observing the subsequent ones. (This restriction only reduces the set of possible deviations and
therefore preserves incentive compatibility.) However, incentive compatibility is harder to ensure
when the agent observes several dimensions at once (see Remark 2 for more detail).
3.2.1 Role of the assumptions
To better appreciate the role of the assumptions in Proposition 1, it is useful to consider a few
counterexamples. The ￿rst one illustrates the role of Assumptions 1 and 3. The other two illustrate
the role of Assumption 5.
Example 1 (Lack of full support) Consider the following simple quasi-linear environment where
T = 2, ￿1 = (0;1), ￿2 = (0;3), Y1 = ?, y2 = (x;p) 2 Y2 = f0;1g ￿ R, and
F2(￿2j￿1) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
0 if ￿2 < 0
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿2 if ￿2 2 [0;1)
1 ￿ ￿1 if ￿2 2 [1;2)
1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿1(￿2 ￿ 2) if ￿2 2 [2;3)
1 if ￿2 ￿ 3
The agent￿ s payo⁄ is U(￿;y) = ￿2x ￿ p. This environment corresponds, for example, to a setting
where the agent is a buyer whose period-1 type represents the probability he assigns to his period-2
valuation for an indivisible object (denoted by ￿2) being higher than 2. Now consider the following
deterministic mechanism
￿(￿1;￿2) =
(
(1;p) if ￿2 2 [p;3)
(0;0) otherwise
15with p 2 [2;3).14 That is, there is a posted price p in period 2. It is easy to see that this mechanism
is IC at any history. The value function, evaluated at period-one history, is thus V ￿(￿1) = E[￿2j￿2 2
[p;3)]Pr(￿2 ￿ pj￿1) =
p+3
2 ￿1(3￿p). The derivative of this function with respect to ￿1 depends on p,
which is in contrast with what is predicted by (IC-FOC). The example also illustrates the failure of
the revenue equivalence result for quasi-linear settings documented in the static literature; we will
come back to the relation between this result and Proposition 1 in Section 4.
Example 2 (Discontinuos transitions) Next, consider the same example discussed above but
now assume that ￿1 = ￿2 = (0;1) and that
F2(￿2j￿1) =
8
<
:
￿2 if ￿1 < 1=2
￿2
2 if ￿1 ￿ 1=2
Now consider the following deterministic mechanism:
￿(￿1;￿2) =
(
(1;p) if ￿1 2 [:5;1)
(0;0) otherwise
with p 2 (1=2;2=3). That is, there is now a forward contract o⁄ered in period 1 at price p for delivery
at period 2. This mechanism is clearly IC at any history. The corresponding value function is
V ￿(￿1) =
8
<
:
0 if ￿1 < 1
2
2
3 ￿ p if ￿1 ￿ 1
2
The value function is thus not Lipschitz continuous in this example and, once again, revenue equiv-
alence fails to obtain.
Example 3 (Lack of equi-Lipschitz continuity) As another example of the role that assump-
tion 5 plays for the result in Proposition 1, consider an environment in which Y1 = (0;+1),
Y2 = ?, ￿1 = ￿2 = (0;1) and where, for any y1; F2(￿2j￿1;y1) is continuously di⁄erentiable in
both ￿1 and ￿2 but is not equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿1: The agent￿ s payo⁄ is U(￿;y) = ￿2: Then
consider the following mechanism
￿(￿1) = arg max
y12Y1
Z
￿2dF2(￿2j￿1;y1)
By construction, the mechanism is IC at any history. Furthermore, by assumption, for any y1, the
function g(￿1;y1) ￿
R
￿2dF2(￿2j￿1;y1) is continuously di⁄erentiable in ￿1: Following Example 1 in
14In this example, we are abusing notation by letting ￿(x;p) denote the distribution that assigns measure one to
(x;p):
16Milgrom and Segal (2002), one can then ￿nd transitions F2 such that the derivative of g(￿1;y1) with
respect to ￿1 is not bounded by any integral function which make the value function discontinuous
in ￿1:
3.2.2 Closed-form expression for expected payo⁄ derivative
The recursive formula for the partial derivative of V ￿ with respect to current type ￿t in Proposition
1 can be iterated backwards to get a closed form formula. Although this can in principle be done
under the assumptions of the proposition, a more compact expression obtains if we make the
following additional assumption.
Assumption 7 For all t and all
￿
￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1, the function Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
is ab-
solutely continuous and its density satis￿es ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
> 0 for a.e. ￿t 2 ￿t.
The existence of a strictly positive density allows us to write the formula in terms of expectation
operators rather than integrals. Using iterated expectations then yields the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1-7 hold. (In the Markov case, Assumption 6 can be dis-
pensed with.) If ￿ is IC at the truthful history ht￿1 ￿ (￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1), then
V ￿(￿t;ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿t, and for a.e. ￿t,
@V ￿(￿t;ht￿1)
@￿t
= E￿[￿]j(￿t;ht￿1)
"
T X
￿=t
J￿
t (~ ￿
￿
; ~ y￿￿1)
@U(~ ￿; ~ y)
@￿￿
#
;
(2)
where Jt
t(~ ￿
t
; ~ yt￿1) ￿ 1 and
J￿
t (￿￿;y￿￿1) ￿
X
K2N, l2NK+1:
t=l0<:::<lK=￿
K Y
k=1
I
lk
lk￿1(￿lk;ylk￿1) for ￿ > t;
with
Im
l (￿m;ym￿1) ￿ ￿
@Fm(￿mj￿m￿1;ym￿1)=@￿l
fm(￿mj￿m￿1;ym￿1)
:
Intuition for (2) is as follows. Im
l can be interpreted as the ￿direct informational index￿ of
signal ￿l about signal ￿m. J￿
t can be interpreted as ￿total informational index￿of ￿t about ￿￿.
It incorporates all the ways in which ￿t can a⁄ect ￿￿, both directly and through the intermediate
signals observed by the agent. Note that in calculating J￿
t each possible chain of e⁄ect must
be counted exactly once. For example, in the Markov case, Im
l = 0 for l < m ￿ 1, and hence
J￿
t
￿
￿￿;y￿￿1￿
=
￿ Y
k=t+1
Ik
k￿1(~ ￿
k
; ~ yk￿1). More generally, the following example suggests that the total
17informational indices could be viewed as ￿impulse responses￿of the stochastic process for ￿ to an
in￿nitesimal change in ￿t.
Example 4 Let ￿t evolve according to an AR(k) process:
￿t =
k X
j=1
￿j￿t￿j + "t,
where ￿t = 0 for any t ￿ 0; ￿j 2 R for any j = 1;:::;k, and "t is the realization of the random
variable ~ "t distributed according to some c.d.f. Gt with strictly positive density over R, independent
from all ~ "s, s 6= t. For convenience, hereafter we let ￿j ￿ 0 for all j > k. Then
F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
= G￿
0
@￿￿ ￿
k X
j=1
￿j￿￿￿j
1
A;
so that for any ￿ > t,
I￿
t
￿
￿￿;y￿￿1￿
￿ ￿
@F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
=@￿t
f￿(￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1)
= ￿￿￿t;
and
J￿
t
￿
￿￿;y￿￿1￿
=
X
M2N, l2NM+1:t=l0<:::<lM=￿
M Y
m=1
￿lm￿lm￿1:
Thus in this case the total informational index J￿
t
￿
￿￿;y￿￿1￿
is simply the ￿impulse response func-
tion￿for the AR(k) process. Note also that here the total informational index is only a function of
t and ￿ but not of (￿;y). In the special case of an AR(1) process we have
I￿
t
￿
￿￿;y￿￿1￿
=
(
￿1 if ￿ = t + 1
0 otherwise,
which implies that J￿
t
￿
￿￿;y￿￿1￿
= (￿1)
￿￿t.
3.3 Necessary Conditions for IC: Independent-Shock Approach
In this section, we illustrate an alternative approach to the characterization of the agent￿ s payo⁄
in an incentive-compatible mechanism. This approach is based on the idea that any stochastic
process admits an equivalent representation in which the information the agent receives over time
can be described as a function of ￿shocks￿that are serially independent (see also Eso and Szentes,
2007, for a similar approach in a two-period-one-decision model). This approach complements the
18one illustrated in the previous section in two ways: ￿rst, it permits us to accommodate the case
T = +1; second, even when restricted to the case T < +1; it permits us to identify a di⁄erent
set of assumptions on the primitive environment that guarantee that the agent￿ s payo⁄ in any
incentive-compatible mechanism is pinned down by an envelope condition.
We start by de￿ning what we mean when we say that a process admits an independent-shock
representation. Next, we de￿ne in what sense this representation is ￿strategically equivalent￿to the
original one and hence can be used as an alternative approach to the characterization of incentive-
compatible mechanisms. We then proceed by showing how the formula for the (derivative of the)
agent￿ s payo⁄ simpli￿es when the agent is asked to report the shocks instead of his types and
identify conditions on the agent￿ s reduced-form payo⁄ (i.e. when expressed as a function of the
shocks) that validate this formula. Finally, we conclude by showing that any stochastic process
admits a particular independent-shock representation, which we use to identify conditions for the
primitive environment that guarantee that in the corresponding independent-shock representation
the agent￿ s reduced-form payo⁄ is ￿well-behaved￿in the sense that it satis￿es an envelope formula
analogous to the one derived in the previous section. While these conditions di⁄er from the ones
identi￿ed above, the formula for the derivative of the agent￿ s payo⁄ reduces to the one in the
previous section when expressed in terms of the primitive representation.
De￿nition 7 Fix T 2 N [ f+1g and let ~ " ￿ (~ "t)T
t=1 denote a collection of random variables
with support E ￿ ￿T
t=1Et ￿ RT and distribution G and z ￿
￿
zt : Et ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿t
￿T
t=1 denote
a collection of functions of these variables and of the decisions y. We say that (G;z) is an
independent-shock representation for the stochastic process that corresponds to the kernels F ￿
￿
Ft : ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(￿t)
￿T
t=1 if
(i) for each t, there exists a probability measure Gt on Et such that G = ￿T
t=1Gt; and
(ii) for any t, "t￿1 2 Et￿1 and yt￿1 2 Y t￿1, the distribution of zt(~ "t;yt￿1) given yt￿1 and ~ "t￿1 =
"t￿1 is the same as the distribution of ￿t given yt￿1 and ￿t￿1 = zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2) ￿ (z￿("￿;y￿￿1))t￿1
￿=1.
Together, conditions (i) and (ii) say that, for any y, one can think of the agent￿ s primitive
information ￿ as being generated by the independent ￿shocks￿~ ".
Note that a more general de￿nition of an independent-shock representation allows the distribu-
tions of the shocks G to depend on the decisions y. It is only to ease the exposition that we assume
away such a dependence: it is in fact immediate that all the subsequent results apply also to the
case where G depends on y:
Example 5 Consider the AR(k) process described in 4. In this example, the functions zt do not
19depend on y. They are given by
z1("1) = "1
z2("2) = ￿1"1 + "2
z3("3) = ￿1(￿1"1 + "2) + ￿2"1 + "3 = (￿2
1 + ￿2)"1 + ￿1"2 + "3
:::
zt("t) =
Pt
j=1
2
4
X
M2N, l2NM+1:j=l0<:::<lM=t
M Y
m=1
￿lm￿lm￿1
3
5"j:
Suppose now the agent￿ s information ￿ is generated by the independent shocks " and let z :
E ￿ Y ! ￿ denote the function de￿ned by
z(";y) ￿ (z￿("￿;y￿￿1))T
￿=1:
Assume further that the agent observes not only ￿ but also the shocks ". The agent￿ s payo⁄ can
then be expressed in terms of the shocks " and the decisions y by the function ^ U : E ￿ Y ! R
de￿ned by
^ U(";y) ￿ U(z(";y);y): (3)
Next, consider a (randomized direct) mechanism
^ ￿ ￿
D
^ ￿t : Et ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(Yt)
ET
t=1
;
in which the agent reports the shocks " instead of his primitive payo⁄-relevant information ￿.
For any t any yt￿1 2 Y t￿1, then let ^ Gt(￿jzt(~ "t;yt￿1)) denote the regular conditional probability
distribution of the vector ~ "t given the sigma-algebra ￿(zt(~ "t;yt￿1)) generated by the random vector
zt(~ "t;yt￿1).15
The primitive representation (U;F) is equivalent to the representation (^ U;G;Z) in the following
sense.
Lemma 2 (a) Given any ex-ante IC mechanism ￿ for the primitive representation (U;F), there
exists an ex-ante IC mechanism ^ ￿ for the corresponding independent-shock representation (^ U;G;z)
such that, for any t, any measurable set A ￿ Yt, and any (￿t;yt￿1),
Z
^ ￿t(Aj"t;yt￿1)d ^ Gt("tjzt("t;yt￿1) = ￿t) = ￿t(Aj￿t;yt￿1): (4)
15Such a regular conditional probability distribution here exists since "
t 2 R
t. See, e.g., Dudley (2002).
20(b) Given any ex-ante IC mechanism ^ ￿ for the independent-shock representation (^ U;G;z), there
exists an ex-ante IC mechanism ￿ for the primitive representation (U;F) such that, for any t, any
measurable set A ￿ Yt, and any (￿t;yt￿1), (4) holds.
Hence any outcome (i.e., any joint distribution over ￿ ￿ Y ) that can be sustained by having
the agent report the payo⁄-relevant information ￿ can also be sustained by having him report the
shocks ", and vice versa. Note that Part (a) follows directly from the fact that if the mechanism ￿
is ex-ante IC, then the mechanism ^ ￿ de￿ned by
^ ￿t(￿j"t;yt￿1) = ￿t(￿jzt("t;yt￿1);yt￿1) 8("t;yt￿1) (5)
is also ex-ante IC. This mechanism de facto uses the same information as ￿, in the sense that it
depends on " only through z(";y). Part (b) is also trivially satis￿ed. It su¢ ces to construct ￿ from
^ ￿ using the transformation de￿ned in (4). To see that if ^ ￿ is ex-ante IC, so is ￿, it su¢ ces to note
that (i) payo⁄s depend on the shocks " only thought z(";y), (ii) ￿ induces the same distribution
over ￿ ￿ Y as ^ ￿, and (iii) any distribution over ￿ ￿ Y that the agent can induce given ￿ could
also have been induced given ^ ￿.
Suppose now that an independent-shock representation exists. (We will show below that this is
always the case.) One can then use this representation as an alternative route to the characterization
of the properties of incentive-compatible mechanisms. In particular, one can treat the shocks as
the agent￿ s private information and then express the dynamics of the agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ in
terms of the (derivative of the) value function with respect to the shocks. To this aim, let
^ H ￿
￿
("s;mt;yu) 2 Es ￿ Et ￿ Y u with T ￿ s ￿ t ￿ u ￿ s ￿ 1
￿
denote the set of all possible histories in the extensive form corresponding to ^ ￿. For any ^ h 2 ^ H, let
^ ￿[^ ￿]j^ h denote the (unique) probability measure over E ￿E ￿Y induced by assuming that following
history ^ h in the mechanism ^ ￿, the agent reports truthfully at any subsequent information set.
Finally, let ^ V
^ ￿(^ h) denote the agent￿ s value function in ^ ￿ evaluated at history ^ h. We then have the
following result.
Proposition 3 Fix t and suppose that Gt is strictly increasing over the interval Et ￿ R, with
R
j"tjdGt("t) < 1; and that there exists an At 2 R+ such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y;16 the
function ^ U((￿;"￿t);y) : Et ! R is At-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable. Then if ^ ￿ is IC at
16Throughout, E￿t ￿ ￿￿6=tE￿:
21the truthful history ^ ht￿1 = ("t￿1;"t￿1;yt￿1),
^ V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in "t, and for a.e. "t,
@ ^ V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1)
@"t
= E^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;^ ht￿1
"
@ ^ U(~ "; ~ y)
@"t
#
:
(6)
While, when T < +1; the result follows directly from Proposition 2; the proof below is actually
simpler and follows essentially from the same arguments as in a static setting (see, e.g., Milgrom
and Segal, 2002).
Condition (6) thus provides an alternative representation of how the agent￿ s payo⁄ must vary
with the agent￿ s private information in an IC mechanism. In certain applications (e.g. the AR(k)
example described above), working directly with the reduced-form payo⁄ ^ U may actually facilitate
the characterization of the properties of optimal mechanisms. For the result in Proposition 3 to be
useful, it is however important to understand what properties of the primitive payo⁄ function U
and of the functions z guarantee that the agent￿ s reduced-form payo⁄ ^ U is equi-Lipschitz continuous
and di⁄erentiable in each "t. This is what we address next.
To accommodate the possibility that T = +1; we ￿rst introduce some additional notation. Let
k￿k denote a norm on ￿ and then denote by B(￿) ￿ f￿ 2 ￿ : k￿k < +1g the set of types whose
norm is ￿nite.17 Hereafter, we will then assume that the domain of U is B(￿)￿Y and that, given
the stochastic process that corresponds to the kernels F; ￿ 2 B(￿) almost surely. We can then
establish the following result.
Proposition 4 Fix t and suppose that Et is an interval and that there exist scalars K;Qt 2 R+
such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y , the function U(￿;y) : B(￿) ! R is K￿Lipschitz continuous
and (Frechet) di⁄erentiable in ￿ (in the appropriate norm) and the function z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! B(￿)
is Qt￿Lipschitz continuous and (Frechet) di⁄erentiable in "t. Then there exists an At 2 R+ such
that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿Y; the function ^ U((￿;"￿t);y) : Et ! R is At￿Lipschitz continuous and
di⁄erentiable and its derivative is given by
@ ^ U(";y)
@"t
=
T X
s=t
@U(z(";y);y)
@￿s
@zs("s;ys￿1)
@"t
:
The proof follows directly from the chain rule of Frechet di⁄erentiability. Note that, when T is
￿nite, then Frechet di⁄erentiability reduces to standard multivariate di⁄erentiability. In this case,
17When T < +1, the speci￿cation of the norm is irrelevant ￿all norms on ￿ are equivalent. On the contrary,
with T = +1; the speci￿cation of the norm is important ￿properties such as Frechet di⁄erentiability and Lipschitz
continuity may hold only with respect to certain norms. Because the selection of a norm is speci￿c to the application
under examination, hereafter we leave the description of the norm unspeci￿ed. However, we note that, for many
applications, we ￿nd the following norm convenient: jj￿jj￿ ￿ supt ￿
t￿1j￿tj, for some ￿ 2 (0;1):
22a su¢ cient condition for z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! B(￿) to be di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous
is that each zs((￿;"s
￿t);ys￿1) : Et ! ￿s is di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous in "t, t < s:
While the aforementioned conditions are general, they need not be easily checkable, especially
when T = +1: Hereafter, we thus provide some su¢ cient conditions that are stronger but often
satis￿ed in applications.
Assumption 8 There exists a collection of functions u ￿
￿
ut : ￿t ￿ Y t ! R
￿T
t=1 and a collection of
scalars B ￿ (Bt)T
t=1 with Bt 2 R+ for all t and
PT
t=1 Bt < +1 such that: (i) for any (￿;y) 2 ￿￿Y ,
U(￿;y) =
T X
t=1
ut(￿t;yt) (7)
and (ii) for any t any yt 2 Y t; ut(￿;yt) is Bt-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable.
With a ￿nite horizon, part (i) is always trivially satis￿ed and Assumption 8 is equivalent to
assuming that the function U(￿;y) is equi-Lipschitz and di⁄erentiable (as a multi-variate function)
in ￿: With an in￿nite horizon, assuming that U admits the additive representation of (7) is clearly
not without loss of generality. However, note that such a representation is quite standard in
applications. We then have the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that assumptions 1 and 8 hold. Fix t and suppose that Et is an interval
and that for any ￿ ￿ t; there exists a Ct;￿ 2 R+ such that (a) for all ("￿
￿t;y￿￿1) 2 E￿
￿t ￿ Y ￿￿1;18
the function z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! ￿t is Ct;￿-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable, and (b)
PT
￿=t Ct;￿ < +1: Then the conclusion of Proposition 4 hold.
It is easy to see that the conditions on the functions z assumed in the proposition are satis￿ed
for example when ￿ evolves according to an AR(k) process with
￿
￿￿j
￿
￿ < 1 for all j = 1;:::;k: More
generally, at this point one may wonder which processes admit an independent-shock representation
and which one admit an independent-shock representation for which the corresponding z functions
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5. We address each of these questions in turn.
First, we show that any process admits a particular independent-shock representation, which
henceforth we refer to as the canonical representation. This representation is derived from the
kernels F as follows. Let ~ " denote a (possibly in￿nite) vector of independent random variables,
each uniformly distributed over (0;1). Next, for any t, any " 2 (0;1), any (￿t￿1;yt￿1); let
F￿1
t ("j￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ inff￿t : Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ "g
18E
￿
￿t ￿ ￿j2Nnftg;j￿￿E￿:
23denote the generalized inverse of the kernel Ft. Now let z : E ￿Y ￿! ￿ be the mapping recursively
de￿ned by
zt("t;yt￿1) ￿ F￿1
t ("t j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;yt￿1) 8t (8)
Applying the probability integral transform theorem recursively(see, e.g., Angus, 1994), one can
then show that, given any yt￿1 2 Y t￿1 and any "t￿1 2 (0;1)t￿1, the distribution of zt(~ "t;yt￿1) given
yt￿1 and ~ "t￿1 = "t￿1 is the same as the distribution of ￿t given yt￿1 and ￿t￿1 = (F￿1
1 ("1);F￿1
2 ("2 j
F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;yt￿1). Hence, any process admits an independent-shock representation in which, for
any t, Gt is simply the uniform distribution over (0;1) and where the functions zt : Et￿Y t￿1 ! ￿t
are the ones de￿ned in (8).
Using the canonical representation, one can then identify conditions on the kernels F that
guarantee that the corresponding zt functions, as de￿ned in (8), satisfy the properties of Proposition
5.
Assumption 9 For any t ￿ 2 there exists a Dt 2 R+ such that (a) for any " 2 (0;1) any
yt￿1 2 Y t￿1; the function F￿1
t ("j￿;yt￿1) is Dt￿ Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable, and (b)19
T X
t=2
Dt
2
6
6
41 +
X
l2N:1<l<t
Dl +
X
K2N, l2NK+1:
2￿l0<:::<lK￿t￿1
lK Y
l=l0
Dl
3
7
7
5 < +1:
Assumption 10 For any t ￿ 1; there exists a Mt 2 R+ such that, for any (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿
Y t￿1; the function F￿1
t (￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) is Mt￿ Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable.
Together, assumptions 9 and 10 guarantee that the functions zt obtained from the kernels F
using the transformation de￿ned in (8) satisfy the properties of Proposition 5 (see the proof of
Proposition 6 in the appendix).
Combining all the conditions on the primitive environment (U;F) identi￿ed above then gives
the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose assumptions 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10 hold. If ^ ￿ is IC at the truthful history
^ ht￿1 ￿ ("t￿1;"t￿1;yt￿1), then
V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in "t, and for a.e. "t,
@V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1)
@"t
= ^ It
t("t;yt￿1)
(
E^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;^ ht￿1
"
T X
￿=t
^ J￿
t (~ "￿; ~ y￿￿1)
@U(zT(~ "T; e yT￿1); e yT)
@￿￿
#)
;
(9)
19Note that condition (b) is trivially satis￿ed when T is ￿nite.
24where ^ Jt
t("t;yt￿1) ￿ 1 and
^ J￿
t ("￿;y￿￿1) ￿
X
K2N, l2NK+1:
t=l0<:::<lK=￿
K Y
k=1
^ I
lk
lk￿1 for ￿ > t;
with
^ It
t("t;yt￿1) ￿
@F￿1
t ("t j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;yt￿1)
@"t
and
^ Im
l ("m;ym￿1) ￿
@F￿1
m ("m j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;ym￿1)
@￿l
if m > l:
Proposition 6 thus identi￿es a new set of conditions for the primitive environment (U;F) that
guarantee that, in any IC mechanism, the agent￿ s expected payo⁄, when expressed using the canon-
ical representation, satis￿es the envelope formula of (6). Comparing the conditions in this propo-
sition with those in Proposition 1, one can see that while the assumptions in Proposition 1 rule
out, for example, an atom at ￿t = ￿
#
t that ￿shifts￿with the past ￿t￿1 (e.g., fully persistent types),
such a possibility is accommodated by the assumptions in Proposition 6. On the other hand, the
assumptions in Proposition 6 rule out an atom at ￿t = ￿
#
t whose measure grows with ￿t￿1 while
such a possibility is allowed by the assumptions in Proposition 1. The assumptions in the two
propositions are thus not nested and hence describe possibly di⁄erent environments.
Also note that the functions ^ I and ^ J in Proposition 6 are the analog of the direct and total
information indexes in the primitive representation. The formula in (9) thus provides a useful
alternative closed-form representation for the derivative of the value function that one can use, for
example, when some of the assumptions in Proposition 2 are violated.
Finally note that, while the formula in (9) describes the dynamics of the value function in the
mechanism ^ ￿ in which the agent reports the shocks " instead of his payo⁄-relevant types ￿; the same
formula also permits one to express the derivative of the value function in the original mechanism
￿ in which the agent reports ￿ instead of ": To see this, it su¢ ces to proceed as follows. Take any
mechanism ￿ for the primitive representation (U;F) and let ^ ￿ be the corresponding mechanism
in the independent-shock representation that is obtained from ￿ using (5). Because, for any y,
the agent￿ s payo⁄ in ^ ￿ depends on " only through z(";y), we have that, for any yt￿1 and "t the
following identity holds:
^ V
^ ￿("t;"t￿1;yt￿1) = V ￿(zt("t;yt￿1);zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2);yt￿1): (10)
25Therefore, at any point of di⁄erentiability of ^ V
^ ￿ in "t,
@ ^ V
^ ￿("t;"t￿1;yt￿1)
@"t
=
@V ￿(zt("t;yt￿1);zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2);yt￿1)
@￿t
@zt("t;yt￿1)
@"t
: (11)
While conditions (10) and (11) hold for all independent-shock representations, when (G;z) is the
canonical representation of F;
@zt("t;yt￿1)
@"t
= ^ It
t("t;yt￿1):
Combining (11) with (9), one can then verify that if, in addition to the assumptions in Proposition
6, assumptions 3 and 7 hold, then ^ It
t("t;yt￿1) 6= 0 and
^ I￿
t ("￿;y￿￿1) = I￿
t (￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1)
￿ ￿
￿￿=z￿("￿;y￿￿1)
and ^ J￿
t ("￿;y￿￿1) = J￿
t (z￿("￿;y￿￿1);y￿￿1):
The following is then an immediate implication of the aforementioned results.
Proposition 7 Suppose the primitive environment (U;F) satis￿es assumptions 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9,
and 10. Then the conclusions of Proposition 2 hold.
Note that assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 7 are also present in Proposition 2. Assumption 8 is stronger
than assumption 4. On the other hand, assumptions 5 and 6 are not implied by assumptions 9 and
10. The two propositions thus identify di⁄erent sets of necessary conditions for the validity of the
dynamic payo⁄ formula given in (2).
3.4 Su¢ cient conditions for IC
While formula (2) summarizes local (￿rst-order) incentive constraints, it does not imply the satis-
faction of all (global) incentive constraints. In this section we formulate some su¢ cient conditions
for incentive compatibility. These conditions generalize the well-known monotonicity condition,
which together with the ￿rst-order condition characterizes incentive-compatible mechanisms in the
static model with a one-dimensional type space. The static characterization cannot be extended to
the dynamic model, which could be viewed as an instance of a multidimensional mechanism design
problem, for which the characterization of IC mechanisms is more di¢ cult (see, e.g., Rochet and
Stole, 2003). More precisely, there are two sources of di¢ culty in ensuring incentive compatibility
of a dynamic mechanism: (a) in general one needs to consider multiperiod deviations, since once the
agent lies in one period, his optimal continuation strategy may require lying in subsequent periods
as well; 20 and (b) even if one focuses on single-period deviations, in which the agent misrepresents
20It is possible to ensure that truthtelling is optimal even after deviations by allowing the agent to re-report his
complete history ￿
t in each period t, possibly contradicting his earlier reports. This is the version of the revelation
26his current one-dimensional type, the decisions assigned by the mechanism from that period onward
form a multidimensional decision space.
While these problems make it hard to have a general characterization of incentive compatibility,
we can still formulate su¢ cient conditions for IC that prove useful in a number of applications.
Problem (a) is sidestepped by focusing on environments in which we can assure that truthtelling
is an optimal continuation strategy even following deviations, and so incentive compatibility can
be assured by checking one-period deviations. (While this focus is quite restrictive, it includes all
Markov environments, as well as some other interesting cases￿ see for example the application to
sequential auctions with AR(k) values considered in subsection 5.2). Problem (b) is sidestepped
by formulating a monotonicity condition that, while not necessary for IC, is su¢ cient and is easy
to check in applications.
Proposition 8 Suppose the environment satis￿es either the assumptions of Proposition 2 or those
of Proposition 7. Fix any period t and for any period-t history h, let
D￿ (h) ￿ E￿[￿]jh
"
T X
￿=t
J￿
t (~ ￿
￿
; ~ y￿￿1)
@U(~ ￿; ~ y)
@￿￿
#
:
Suppose that for any truthful history
￿
￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
,
(i) E￿[￿]j((￿t￿1;￿t);￿t￿1;yt￿1)[U(~ ￿; ~ y)] is Lipschitz continuous in ￿t, and for a.e. ￿t,
d
d￿t
E￿[￿]j((￿t￿1;￿t);￿t￿1;yt￿1)[U(~ ￿; ~ y)] = D￿ ￿
(￿t￿1;￿t);(￿t￿1;￿t);yt￿1￿
:
(ii) For any mt, for a.e. ￿t,
￿
D￿ ￿
(￿t￿1;￿t);(￿t￿1;￿t);yt￿1￿
￿ D￿ ￿
(￿t￿1;￿t);(￿t￿1;mt);yt￿1￿￿
￿ (￿t ￿ mt) ￿ 0;
(iii) ￿ is IC at any (possibly non-truthful) period t + 1 history.
Then ￿ is IC at any truthful period-t history.
Propositions 2 and 7 imply that condition (i) in Proposition 8 is a necessary condition for
the mechanism to be IC at all truthful period-t histories (Recall that this means that the agent￿ s
value function at these histories coincides with the expected equilibrium payo⁄). The addition of
conditions (ii) and (iii) is then su¢ cient (but in general not necessary) for IC at all truthful period-
t histories￿ The proof is based on a lemma in the appendix that extends to a dynamic setting a
principle proposed by Doepke and Townsend (2006). While this approach would allow us to restrict attention to
one-stage deviations from truthtelling, the deviations in each period would now be multidimensional, and contingent
on possibly inconsistent reporting histories, so it is not clear that this approach would simplify the characterization
of the su¢ cient conditions.
27result by Garcia, 2005 for static mechanism design with one-dimensional type and multidimensional
decisions.
The assumption that the mechanism is IC at all period t + 1 histories, including non-truthful
ones, is rather strong, but it can be satis￿ed in some applications. As one prominent example, in
a Markov setting, the history ￿t of the agent￿ s true types does not a⁄ect his incentives in period
t + 1 after ￿t+1 is observed. Thus, any mechanism that is IC at all truthful period t + 1 histories
must also be IC at all period t + 1 histories. In this case, the Proposition can be iterated starting
from period T + 1 moving backward to establish IC in all periods and at all histories.
4 Multi-agent quasilinear case
We now introduce multiple agents. The multi-agent model we consider features three important
assumptions: (1) the environment is quasilinear (i.e., the decision taken in each period can be
decomposed into an allocation and a vector of monetary payments and the agents￿preferences are
quasilinear in the payments), (2) the type distributions are independent of past monetary payments
(but they may still depend on past allocations), and (3) types are independent across agents. After
setting up the model we show how from the perspective of an individual agent, the model reduces
to the single-agent case studied in the previous section.
4.1 Quasilinear environment
There are N agents indexed by i = 1;:::;N. In each period t = 1;:::;T; each agent i is shown
a nonmonetary ￿allocation￿ xit 2 Xit (where Xit is a measurable space), and asked to make a
payment pit 2 R. The set of feasible joint allocation decisions in period t is Xt ￿
QN
i=1 Xit.21;22
Each agent i observes his own allocations xit but not the others￿allocations x￿i;t: The observ-
ability of xit should be thought of as a technological restriction: A mechanism can reveal more
information to agent i in period t than xit, but it cannot conceal xit. As for the payments, because
none of the results hinges on the speci￿c information the agents receive about p, we leave the
description of the information the agents receive about p unspeci￿ed.
As in the single-agent case, histories are denoted using the superscript notation. For example,
￿
xt;pt￿
is an element of Xt ￿ RNt, where Xt ￿
Qt
￿=1 X￿ and X ￿
QT
￿=1 X￿.
In each period t, each agent i privately observes his current type ￿it 2 ￿it ￿ R. The current
type pro￿le is then denoted by ￿t ￿ (￿1t;:::;￿Nt) 2 ￿t ￿
Q
i ￿it. The distribution of the type
21For example, we can have Xt = fxt 2 R
N
+ :
P
i xit ￿ ￿ xtg when the decision is the allocation of a private good
among agents, or Xt =
￿
xt 2 R
N
+ : x1t = x2t = ::: = xNt
￿
when the decision is the provision of a public good.
22This formulation does not explicitly allow for decisions that are not observed by any agent at the time they are
made; however, such decisions can easily be accomodated by introducing a ￿ctitious agent observing them.
28pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿ ￿
QT
t=1 ￿t is described in the following de￿nition.
We omit superscripts for full histories, with the exception of xT
i ￿ (xi1;:::;xiT), pT
i ￿ (pi1;:::;piT),
and ￿T
i ￿ (￿i1;:::;￿iT) (and the sets they are elements of). This is to avoid confusion between, e.g.,
xt ￿ (x1t;:::;xNt) and xi ￿ (xi1;:::;xiT).
Agent i￿ s payo⁄ function is denoted by Ui : ￿ ￿ X ￿ RT ! R.
We then de￿ne a quasi-linear environment as follows.
De￿nition 8 The environment is quasilinear if the following hold:
1. There is a sequence of decisions (x;p) 2 X ￿ RNT, where x =
￿
xT
1 ;:::;xT
N
￿
is an allocation,
p is a vector of payments, and for all i, xT
i is the minimal information about x received by
agent i.
2. The distribution of the type pro￿le ￿ is governed by the kernels
￿
Ft : ￿t￿1 ￿ Xt￿1 ! ￿(￿t)
￿T
t=1.
3. For all i, the payo⁄ function of each agent i, Ui : ￿ ￿ X ￿ RT ! R, takes the quasilinear
form
Ui(￿;x;pT
i ) = ui(￿;x) ￿
T X
t=1
pit
for some measurable ui : ￿ ￿ X ! R.
Note that part 2 restricts the distribution of ￿ to be independent of the payments. As for part
3, note that for the sake of generality we allow agent i￿ s utility to depend on things he does not
observe, namely xT
￿i and ￿T
￿i.23
De￿nition 9 Types are Independent if for all t, and all
￿
￿t￿1;xt￿1￿
2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Xt￿1,
Ft(￿j￿t￿1;xt￿1) =
N Y
i=1
Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i );
where for all i, Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) is a probability measure on ￿it.
This de￿nition is the proper extension of the Independent-Type assumption of static mechanism
design to the dynamic settings considered here; it permits us to extend such static results as revenue-
equivalence and the virtual surplus representation of expected pro￿ts. Note that the de￿nition can
23Some readers may feel that an agent must always be able to observe his own ￿nal payo⁄ (indeed, this was the
case in our model in Section 3). This can still be compatible with an interdependent-value model in which agent i
observes x
T
￿i and ￿
T
￿i at the end of period T and is unable to report them to the mechanism. If we instead allowed
the agent to report his observed ￿nal payo⁄ in an interdependent-value model to the mechanism, as in Mezzetti
(2004), we would e⁄ectively convert the model to one with correlated private observations, allowing for full surplus
extraction.
29be broken up into three parts: (i) Conditional on any history (￿t￿1;xt￿1), period-t types are
independent across agents. (ii) The distribution of agent i￿ s period-t type, Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ), does
not depend on the other agents￿past types (except possibly indirectly through the decision history
xt￿1
i observed by agent i). (iii) The distribution Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) also does not depend on the history
of decisions xt￿1
￿i that the agent has not observed. It is easy to see that if the assumptions (i) or
(ii) are not satis￿ed, then a mechanism similar to the one proposed by Cremer and McLean (1988)
could be used to extract the agents￿information rents. It turns out that a similar extraction of rents
is possible if assumption (iii) is not satis￿ed by using a randomized mechanism￿ see the discussion
after Proposition 9 below.
Throughout this section we will maintain the assumptions that the environment is quasilinear
and that types are independent. To highlight the role of the other assumptions, we will then
dispense with such quali￿cation in the subsequent results.
4.2 Multi-agent mechanisms
For most of the analysis we will focus on the Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) of mechanisms
designed for the environment described above. As discussed for the single-agent case, this solu-
tion concept imposes the weakest form of rationality on the agents￿behavior and thus yields the
strongest necessary conditions for incentive compatibility. The su¢ cient conditions we o⁄er, will
however ensure implementation with a stronger solution concept such as (weak) Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium.
By the revelation principle (adapted from Myerson, 1986), it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to Bayesian incentive compatible ￿direct mechanisms￿ (de￿ned more precisely
below) where (1) in each period each agent con￿dentially reports his current type ￿it to the mecha-
nism, and (2) the mechanism reports no information back to the agents (i.e., each agent i observes
only (￿T
i ;xT
i ) plus whatever is assumed observable about the payments).24 The proof for (1) is the
familiar one. As for (2), suppose there exists an incentive-compatible direct mechanism where more
information is revealed to the agents than what described in (2). Concealing this additional informa-
tion would then amount to pooling di⁄erent incentive-compatibility constraints resulting in a new
IC mechanism that implements the same outcomes (i.e., the same distribution over ￿￿X ￿RNT).
When exploring the implications of incentive compatibility, it is also convenient to assume
that all payments take place at the very end. This is actually without loss of generality. In fact,
because postponing payments amounts to hiding information, for any IC mechanism in which some
payments are made (and possibly observed) in each period, there exists another IC mechanism in
24In our environment there are no actions to be privately chosen by the agents. If the agents were also to choose
hidden actions, then a direct mechanism would also send the agents recommendations for the hidden actions.
30which all payments are postponed to the end which induces the same distribution over ￿￿X and,
for all ￿, it induces the same total payments.
For notational simplicity hereafter we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. This
entails no loss since randomizations could always be generated by introducing a ￿ctitious agent
whose type is publicly observed. We will also formulate su¢ cient conditions under which such
randomizations will not be useful.
De￿nition 10 A deterministic direct mechanism is a pair h￿; i, where ￿ =
￿
￿t : ￿t ! Xt
￿T
t=1 is
an allocation rule, and   : ￿ ! RN is a (total) payment scheme.
A deterministic direct mechanism h￿; i de￿nes the following sequence in each period t, following
a history ￿t￿1 of type observations and a history mt￿1 =
￿
mt￿1
1 ;:::;mt￿1
N
￿
of type reports by the
agents:
1. Each agent i privately observes his current type ￿it 2 ￿it drawn from Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i (mt￿1)).
2. Each agent i sends a con￿dential message mit 2 ￿it to the mechanism.
3. The mechanism implements the decision ￿t
￿
mt￿
.
4. Each agent i observes ￿it
￿
mt￿
.
After period T, the mechanism also implements the payments  
￿
mT￿
.
A mechanism induces an extensive form game between the agents. A (pure) strategy for agent
i is a complete contingent plan
￿i ￿
￿
￿it : ￿t
i ￿ ￿t￿1
i ￿ Xt￿1
i ! ￿it
￿T
t=1 :
Truthful strategies are de￿ned as in the single-agent case.
If all agents play truthful strategies, a deterministic allocation rule ￿ induces a stochastic
process on the agents￿types ￿ described by the kernels Ft(￿j￿t￿1;￿t￿1(￿t￿1)). We let ￿[￿] denote
the resulting probability measure on ￿. Similarly, if all agents but i are playing truthful strategies,
while agent i follows a strategy ￿i, this induces a stochastic process on
￿
￿;mT
i
￿
2 ￿￿￿T
i , which is
described by the kernels F, allocation rule ￿, and strategy ￿i. We let ￿i[￿;￿i] denote the resulting
probability measure on ￿ ￿ ￿T
i . Equipped with this notation, we can de￿ne ex-ante incentive
compatibility of a mechanism as follows.
De￿nition 11 A deterministic direct mechanism h￿; i is ex-ante Bayesian Incentive Compatible
(ex-ante BIC) if for all i and all ￿i,
E￿[￿][ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) ￿  i(~ ￿)] ￿ E￿i[￿;￿i][ui(~ ￿;￿(~ mT
i ;~ ￿
T
￿i)) ￿  i(~ mT
i ;~ ￿
T
￿i)]:
31That is, a mechanism is ex-ante BIC if the truthful strategies form a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
of the game induced by the mechanism.
4.3 Mapping the multi-agent into the single-agent case
We now show that, from the perspective of each agent, the environment described above can be
mapped into the single-agent model of Section 3. To see this, ￿x an arbitrary agent i. Given any
deterministic mechanism h￿; i, when all agents other than i (henceforth denoted by ￿i) are playing
truthful strategies, agent i e⁄ectively faces a randomized mechanism where the randomizations are
due to the uncertainty that agent i faces about the other agents￿types. Over the course of the
mechanism, agent i only observes (￿T
i ;mT
i ;xT
i ). However, the mechanism depends on the other
agents￿types ￿T
￿i through their equilibrium messages; furthermore, agent i￿ s utility may depend
directly on ￿T
￿i and xT
￿i. Thus evaluating the optimality of i￿ s strategy requires keeping track of his
beliefs about ￿T
￿i conditional on the observed history.
Formally the problem faced by agent i can be mapped into the single-agent model considered in
the previous section as follows. For all t < T, let Yit = Xit, and let YiT = XiT ￿ XT
￿i ￿ ￿T
￿i. Also,
let Yi;T+1 = R. That is, in periods t < T the decision yit = xit consists of the part of the allocation
observed by agent i. In period T, the decision yiT also shows the agent the rest of the variables
a⁄ecting his utility (i.e., the part of the allocation xT
￿i unobservable to him and the other agents￿
types ￿T
￿i). Then in period T + 1, which is introduced just as a convenient modelling device, the
agent observes his payment pT
i :
Agent i￿ s type ￿T
i evolves according to the kernels Fi =
￿
Fit : ￿t￿1
i ￿ Xt￿1
i ! ￿(￿it)
￿T
t=1 =
￿
Fit : ￿t￿1
i ￿ Y t￿1
i ! ￿(￿it)
￿T
t=1, where the equality is by de￿nition of Yit. There is no type in
period T + 1 (formally, ￿i;T+1 can be taken to be an arbitrary singleton).
In the single-agent setup, agent i￿ s payo⁄ is de￿ned over ￿T
i ￿ Y T+1
i , where Y T+1
i =
QT+1
t=1 Yit.
However, by construction ￿T
i ￿ Y T+1
i is simply a reordering of ￿ ￿ X ￿ R￿ the domain of agent
i￿ s payo⁄ in the multi-agent environment. To highlight this connection, we abuse notation and
continue to use Ui with its arguments appropriately reordered.
Agent i faces a randomized mechanism ￿i = ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿
￿it : ￿t
i ￿ Y t￿1
i ! ￿(Yit)
￿T+1
t=1 con-
structed as follows. We ￿rst construct inductively a consistent family of regular conditional
probability distributions (rcpd) that represent the evolution of agent i￿ s beliefs about ￿T
￿i con-
ditional on observable allocations and his own messages.25 Fix t < T. Suppose that a rcpd
￿￿￿1(￿j￿￿￿1
i (m￿￿1
i ;~ ￿
￿￿1
￿i )) on ￿￿￿1
￿i exists for all m￿￿1
i , and all periods ￿ ￿ t. (The conditioning
here is on the random variable ￿￿￿1
i (m￿￿1
i ;~ ￿
￿￿1
￿i ) taking values in Y ￿￿1
i .) Note that the assump-
tion holds vacuously for t = 1. For all mt
i, the rcpd ￿t￿1(￿j￿t￿1
i (mt￿1
i ;~ ￿
t￿1
￿i )) and the kernels
25See, e.g., Dudley (2002) for the de￿nition of a regular conditional probability distributions.
32F￿i;t(￿j￿t￿1
￿i ;￿t￿1
￿i (mt￿1
i ;￿t￿1
￿i )) induce a probability measure on ￿t
￿i. Since ￿t
￿i ￿ RN￿1, there
exists a rcpd of ~ ￿
t
￿i given ￿(￿t
i(mt
i;~ ￿
t
￿i)), where ￿(￿t
i(mt
i;~ ￿
t
￿i)) denotes the sigma-algebra gener-
ated by the random variable ￿t
i(mt
i;~ ￿
t
￿i) (see, e.g., Theorem 10.2.2 in Dudley, 2002). We de￿ne
￿t(￿j￿t
i(mt
i;~ ￿
t
￿i)) to be this rcpd. Consistency of the family follows by construction. At t = T the
decision yiT reveals to the agent ￿T
￿i, and hence his beliefs are degenerate in periods T and T + 1.
Let t < T and ￿x a history (mt
i;yt￿1
i ). Then for any measurable A ￿ Yit, the probability that
yit 2 A is
￿it(Ajmt
i;yt￿1
i ) ￿
Z
f￿t
￿i2￿t
￿i:￿it(mt
i;￿t
￿i)2Ag
dF￿i;t(￿￿i;tj￿t￿1
￿i ;￿t￿1
￿i (mt￿1
i ;￿t￿1
￿i ))d￿t￿1
￿
￿t￿1
￿i j￿t￿1
i (mt￿1
i ;~ ￿
t￿1
￿i ) = yt￿1
i
￿
:
The measure ￿it(￿jmT
i ;yT￿1
i ) is de￿ned analogously except that the integral is over the set
￿
￿T
￿i 2 ￿T
￿i :
￿
￿i(mT
i ;￿T
￿i);￿T
￿i(mT
i ;￿T
￿i);￿T
￿i
￿
2 A
￿
:
Finally, ￿i;T+1(￿jmT
i ;(xT
i ;xT
￿i;￿T
￿i)) is de￿ned to be a point mass at  (mT
i ;￿T
￿i). This de￿nes the
randomized direct mechanism ￿i = ￿i[￿; ].
Thus, from the perspective of agent i, there is a decision yit in each period t, his type ￿it
evolves according to kernels Fi, utility is given by Ui, and he is facing a randomized direct
mechanism ￿i. This is the setup considered in the single-agent part. In particular, let Hi ￿
￿
(￿s
i;mt
i;yu
i ) : s ￿ t ￿ u ￿ s ￿ 1
￿
denote the set of agent i￿ s private histories. Then a strategy ￿i
and a private history hi 2 Hi induce a probability measure ￿i[￿i;￿i]jhi on ￿T
i ￿￿T
i ￿Y T+1
i . Since
￿i is derived from the multi-agent mechanism h￿; i, we abuse notation and write ￿i[h￿; i;￿i]jhi
to emphasize the connection to the original mechanism. For the truthful strategy and the null
history the measure is then denoted ￿i[￿; ]jhi and ￿i[h￿; i;￿i], respectively. The agent￿ s payo⁄
from truthtelling following history hi is thus E￿i[￿; ]jhi[Ui(~ ￿i; ~ yi)] = E￿i[￿; ]jhi[Ui(~ ￿; ~ x; ~ pT
i )], where
the equality is by de￿nition of yi. We can then de￿ne the value function V
￿i[￿; ]
i : Hi ! R and
incentive compatibility at a private history hi analogously to the single-agent case.
It will be convenient to let ￿T
i [￿]jhi denote the marginal of ￿i[￿; ]jhi on ￿T
i ￿ ￿T
i ￿ Y T
i given
private history hi. Thus, ￿T
i [￿]jhi is a process on types, messages, and nonmonetary allocations,
but not on the payments (which by our convention are only made in period T +1). The role of this
notation is to highlight the fact that the stochastic process over everything but the payments in the
quasilinear environment is determined by the allocation rule ￿ and independently of the payment
rule  . Since the payment scheme   is a deterministic function of the messages (which under
￿T
i [￿]jhi are truthful), we can use ￿T
i [￿]jhi to write agent i￿ s payo⁄ as E￿T
i [￿]jhi[ui(~ ￿; ~ x) +  i(~ ￿)].
334.4 Revenue equivalence
Suppose the assumptions in Proposition 1, or alternatively those in Proposition 6, hold for any i.
We then have that in any mechanism that is IC for agent i at a truthful private history ht￿1
i =
￿
￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i
￿
(resp. ^ ht￿1
i ), the derivative of the value function with respect to ￿it (resp. "it)
does not depend on the payment scheme. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, this can be seen
by iterating (IC-FOC) backward starting from t = T. Under the assumptions of Proposition 6 this
can be seen directly from (9).
In a quasi-linear environment, the aforementioned propositions thus imply that, in any ex-
ante BIC mechanism, the value function of each agent i at almost every truthful private history
ht
i =
￿
￿it;ht￿1
i
￿
; t ￿ 1, is pinned down by the allocation rule ￿ up to a constant ki(ht￿1
i ) that may
depend on ht￿1
i , but not on ￿it: This in turn implies that the ￿innovation￿ 26
E￿[￿][ i(~ ￿)j~ ￿it;~ ht￿1
i ] ￿ E￿[￿][ i(~ ￿)j~ ht￿1
i ]
in the expected transfer of each agent i due to his own type ￿it is the same in any two ex-ante BIC
deterministic mechanisms h￿; i and
D
￿; ^  
E
implementing the same allocation rule.
Using the law of iterated expectations, one can also get rid of the dependence of the constant
ki(ht￿1
i ) on the history ht￿1
i . To see this, suppose there is a single agent i and assume, for simplicity,
that there are only two periods. Now consider any two ex-ante IC deterministic mechanisms h￿; i
and
D
￿; ^  
E
implementing the same allocation rule ￿. Then in period two, for any truthful history
h1
i = (￿i1;￿i1;￿(￿i1)), there exists a scalar ￿i(h1
i) = Ki(￿i1) such that, for any ￿i2, V ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿i2;h1
i
￿
￿
V ￿i[￿;^  ] ￿
￿i2;h1
i
￿
= Ki(￿i1). A similar result also applies to period one: there exists a scalar Ki such
that, for each ￿i1, V ￿i[￿; ] (￿i1)￿V ￿i[￿;^  ] (￿i1) = Ki. Because V ￿i[￿; ] (￿i1)￿V ￿i[￿;^  ] (￿i1) is simply
the expectation of V ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿i2;h1
i
￿
￿ V ￿i[￿;^  ] ￿
￿i2;h1
i
￿
, we then have that Ki(￿i1) = Ki for all ￿i1:
Clearly, the same result extends to any T: Furthermore, because the value function coincides with
the equilibrium payo⁄ with probability one and because the latter is simply the di⁄erence between
the expectation of u(~ ￿
T
;￿(~ ￿
T
)) and the expectation of  (~ ￿
T
), we have that the entire payment
scheme   is uniquely determined by the allocation rule ￿ up to a scalar.
Next, consider a setting with multiple agents. Provided that types are independent, then the
total payment that each agent i expects to make to the mechanism as a function his period-one
type is uniquely determined by the allocation rule ￿ up to a scalar Ki that does not depend on ￿i1.
This is the famous "revenue equivalence" result extensively documented in static environments.
More generally, one can show that the same result extends to any arbitrary period t ￿ 1 provided
that the following condition holds.
26Given a mechanism h￿; i; E
￿[￿][ i(~ ￿)j~ h
t
i] denotes the expectation of  i(~ ￿) conditional on the random variable
~ h
t
i, where, as usual, conditional expectations are interpreted as Radon-Nikodym derivatives.
34Assumption 11 (DNOT) Decisions do Not A⁄ect Types: For all i = 1;:::;N, t = 2;:::;T,
￿t￿1
i 2 ￿t￿1
i ; the distribution Fit
￿
￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i
￿
does not depend on xt￿1
i .
We then have the following result.
Proposition 9 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 1, or
those of Proposition 9, hold. Consider any two ex-ante BIC deterministic mechanisms h￿; i and D
￿; ^  
E
implementing the same allocation rule ￿.
(i) Then for all i, there exists a Ki 2 R such that
E￿[￿][ i(~ ￿) j ~ ￿i1] ￿ E￿[￿]j[^  i(~ ￿) j ~ ￿i1] = Ki: (12)
(ii) If, in addition, assumption DNOT holds (with N = 1; assumption DNOT can be dispensed
with), then, for all i and any t;s,
E￿[ i(~ ￿) j ~ ￿
t
i] ￿ E￿[^  i(~ ￿) j ~ ￿
t
i] = E￿[ i(~ ￿) j ~ ￿
s
i] ￿ E￿[^  i(~ ￿) j ~ ￿
s
i]: (13)
The value of Proposition 9 is twofold: (a) it sheds light on certain real-world institutions (for
example, it can be used to establish revenue-equivalence across di⁄erent dynamic auctions formats);
(b) it facilitates the characterization of pro￿t-maximizing mechanisms by permitting one to express
the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ as expected virtual surplus, as illustrated below. Both (a) and
(b) use the result of Proposition 9 only for t = 1: However, the property that, when decisions do
not a⁄ect types, the di⁄erence in expected payments remains constant over time in the sense of
condition (13) also turns useful in certain applications.
Note also that the result in Proposition 9 can be sharpened by considering a stronger solution
concept. Suppose one is interested in mechanisms with the property that each agent ￿nds it
optimal to report truthfully even after being shown at the beginning of the game, before learning
his period-one type, the entire pro￿le of the other agents￿ types ￿T
￿i. Then a simple iterated
expectation argument similar to the one sketched above implies that, for each agent i, payments
are uniquely determined not only in expectation but for each state (￿T
i ;￿T
￿i): given any pair of
ex-ante BIC deterministic mechanisms h￿; i and
D
￿; ^  
E
implementing the same allocation rule,
for any i there exists a scalar Ki(￿T
￿i) such that  i(￿T
i ;￿T
￿i)￿^  i(￿T
i ;￿T
￿i) = Ki(￿T
￿i) for any ￿T
￿i: (We
provide su¢ cient conditions for the resulting mechanism to satisfy this robustness to information
leakage in Corollary 1 below.)
Lastly, note that a key assumption in Proposition 9 is that types are independent. As mentioned
above, this assumption has two parts: First, it requires that, given (￿t￿1;xt￿1), current types are
independent across agents; Second it requires that the distribution of each agent i￿ s current type
35￿it depends only on objects observable to agent i, that is, on (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ). The importance of the
￿rst part for revenue equivalence is well understood. The arguments are the same as in static
environments (see, e.g., Cremer and McLean, 1988). The importance of the second part may be
less obvious. To see it, suppose for simplicity there are only two periods and assume that the
distribution of ￿i2 depends not only on ￿i1;xi1 but also on a variable x￿i;1 that is not directly
observed by agent i but which is observed by the principal (or by whoever runs the mechanism).
Depending on the application, one may think of x￿i;1 as the amount of R&D commissioned to a
research lab (the principal) by competitive clients (the other agents); alternatively, one may think
of x￿i;1 as the unobservable quality of a product supplied by the principal to buyer i. If x￿i;1 is
known to the principal but not to agent i and if it is correlated with ￿i2, then the principal can
extract all the private information that agent i possesses about ￿i2 for free (the arguments here are
once again the same as in the case of correlated types). This clearly precludes revenue equivalence.
4.5 Dynamic virtual surplus and optimal mechanisms
In a static setting, the envelope formula permits one to calculate the agents￿information rents,
providing a useful tool for designing optimal mechanisms. We show here how this approach extends
to a dynamic setting. We start by showing how the dynamic payo⁄ formula derived in Section 3
permits one to compute expected rents and then show how the latter can be used to derive optimal
mechanisms.
Suppose that, in addition to the N agents, there is a ￿principal￿(referred to as ￿agent 0￿ ) who
designs the mechanism and whose payo⁄ takes the quasilinear form
U0(￿;x;p) = u0(x;￿) +
N X
i=1
pi
for some measurable function u0 : ￿ ￿ X ! R. As standard in the literature, we assume that the
principal designs the mechanism and then makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the agents in period
one after each agent has observed his ￿rst-period type.27 We then restrict the principal to o⁄er a
mechanism that is accepted in equilibrium by all agents with probability one. Hereafter, we will
refer to any such mechanism as an Individually-Rational Bayesian-Incentive-Compatible (IR-BIC)
mechanism.
The requirement that all agents accept the mechanism gives rise to participation constraints in
period 1. In addition, agents might have the ability to quit the mechanism at later stages, which
may give rise to participation constraints in subsequent periods. However, the principal can always
27If the principal could approach the agents at the ex-ante stage, before they learn their private information, she
could extract all the surplus and hence she would implement an e¢ cient allocation rule.
36relax all the participation constraints after the initial acceptance decision by asking each agent to
post a bond when accepting the mechanism; this bond is forfeited if the agent quits the mechanism,
else is returned to the agent after period T.28 Thus, we can restrict attention to the participation
constraints that each agent faces at the moment he is being o⁄ered the mechanism. This constraint
requires that each agent￿ s expected payo⁄ in the mechanism upon observing his ￿rst-period type
be at least as high as the payo⁄ the agent obtains by refusing to participate in the mechanism (i.e.
his reservation payo⁄). For simplicity, we assume that reservation payo⁄s are equal to zero for all
agents and all types. The participation constraints can then be written as
V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1) ￿ 0 for all i, almost all ￿i1 2 ￿i1: (14)
The principal￿ s problem thus consists in choosing an ex-ante BIC mechanism h￿; i that maxi-
mizes her expected payo⁄ among those that satisfy the agents￿period-1 participation constraints.
While this problem appears quite complicated, it can be simpli￿ed by ￿rst setting up a ￿Relaxed
Program￿that contains only a subset of the constraints, and then providing conditions for a solution
to the Relaxed Program to satisfy all of the constraints. In particular, the Relaxed Program
replaces all the incentive-compatibility constraints with the local incentive-compatibility conditions
embodied in the period-1 dynamic payo⁄ formula derived in Section 3. Speci￿cally, assuming for
simplicity that the distributions satisfy Assumption 7, according to Proposition 2, ex-ante IC for
agent i implies that
V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1) is Lipschitz continuous, and for a.e. ￿i1,
@V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1)
@￿i1
= E￿T
i [￿]j￿i1
"
T X
￿=1
J￿
i1(~ ￿
￿
i ; ~ x￿￿1
i )
@ui(~ ￿; ~ x)
@￿i￿
#
:
(15)
The requirement that h￿; i is ex-ante BIC then implies that, for each i = 1;::::;N, agent i￿ s ex-
ante equilibrium expected payo⁄ coincides with the expectation of his value function. Condition
(15) can then be used to calculate the agents￿expected information rents. Letting ￿i1(￿i1) ￿
fi1(￿i1)=(1￿Fi1(￿i1)) denote the hazard rate of the distribution Fi1 and integrating by parts, then
28The possibility of bonding relies on the following assumptions: (a) unrestricted monetary transfers (in particular,
unlimited liability); (b) quasilinear utilities (which rules out any bene￿t from consumption smoothing); and (c)
continuation utilities in the mechanism being bounded from below and continuation utilities from quitting being
bounded from above. If these assumptions are not satis￿ed, one has to consider participation constraints in all
periods, which makes the analysis considerably harder. For an application without bonding, see, for example, Pavan,
Segal, and Toikka (2008).
37gives
E￿[￿][Ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿); i(~ ￿))] = E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ](~ ￿i1)] (16)
= E￿[￿]
"
1
￿i1(~ ￿i1)
T X
￿=1
J￿
i1(~ ￿
￿
i ;￿￿￿1
i (~ ￿
￿￿1
))
@ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))
@￿i￿
#
+ V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1):
As for the participation constraints, the Relaxed Program considers only those for the lowest types
￿i1:
V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1) ￿ 0 (17)
Finally, the relaxed program treats the functions V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1) in (16) and (17) as control variables
that can be chosen independently from (￿; ). Formally, the Relaxed Program can thus be stated
as follows.
Pr :
8
<
:
max
￿; ;(V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1))N
i=1
E￿[￿][U0(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿); (~ ￿))]
s.t., for all i = 1;:::;N; (16) and (17) hold
Substituting (16) into the principal￿ s payo⁄ then gives the following result.
Lemma 3 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 2 or Proposi-
tion 7 hold, and ￿i1 > ￿1. Then the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ in any IR-BIC mechanism h￿; i
equals
E￿[￿][U0(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿); (~ ￿))] =
E￿[￿]
"
N X
i=0
ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) ￿
N X
i=1
1
￿i1(~ ￿i1)
T X
t=1
Jt
i1(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))
@ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))
@￿it
#
￿
N X
i=1
V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1):
In what follows we will refer to the expression
E￿[￿]
"
N X
i=0
ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) ￿
N X
i=1
1
￿i1(~ ￿i1)
T X
t=1
Jt
i1(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))
@ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))
@￿it
#
; (18)
as the ￿expected dynamic virtual surplus.￿It is then immediate that a necessary and a su¢ cient
condition for (￿; ;(V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1))N
i=1) to solve the Relaxed Program is that the allocation rule ￿
maximizes the expected dynamic virtual surplus, that the participation constraints of the lowest
38period-1 types bind, i.e.
V ￿i[￿; ](￿i1) = 0 for all i; (19)
and that the payment function   satis￿es (16). Clearly, if the solution to the relaxed program
satis￿es all the incentive and participation constraints, then it also solves the ￿Full Program￿
that consists in maximizing the principal￿ s ex-ante expected payo⁄ among all mechanisms that are
IR-BIC. We then have the following result.
Proposition 10 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 2 or
Proposition 7 hold, and ￿i1 > ￿1. Suppose there exists an IR-BIC mechanism h￿; i such that
the allocation rule ￿ maximizes the ￿expected dynamic virtual surplus￿(18), the lowest types￿par-
ticipation constraints (19) bind, and all the participation constraints (14) are satis￿ed. Then the
following are true:
(i) the mechanism h￿; i solves the Full Program;
(ii) in any mechanism that solves the Full Program, the allocation rule must maximize the
expected dynamic virtual surplus (18);
(iii) the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ cannot be increased using randomized mechanisms.
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) follow directly from Lemma 3. As for part (iii), note that, from the
perspective of each single agent, a randomized mechanism is equivalent to a mechanism that condi-
tions on the types of some ￿ctitious agent N +1. The characterization of the necessary conditions
for incentive compatibility in a stochastic mechanism thus parallels that for deterministic ones.
Because the principal￿ s payo⁄ under a stochastic mechanisms can always be expressed as a convex
combination of her payo⁄s under di⁄erent deterministic mechanisms, it is then immediate that
stochastic mechanisms cannot raise the principal￿ s expected payo⁄. (This point was made in static
mechanism design by Strausz, 2006).
Of course, Proposition 10 is only useful if one can indeed ensure that a solution to the Relaxed
Program satis￿es all the incentive and participation constraints. We will give some su¢ cient con-
ditions for this in subsection 4.7. Below we ￿rst focus on the Relaxed Program and characterize
the distortions in the optimal allocation rule relative to the e¢ cient one.
4.6 Distortions
To begin with, we consider a special class of environments in which the expected virtual surplus
(18) can be maximized separately for all periods and states without the need to solve a dynamic
programming problem. This occurs when, in addition to assumption DNOT, the following property
holds.
39Assumption 12 (USEP) Utilities Time-Separable in Decisions: For all i = 0;:::;N, ui (x;￿) =
PT
t=1 uit (￿t;xt).
Recall that, under assumption DNOT, the stochastic process ￿ over ￿ is exogenous and does not
depend on the mechanism. If in addition USEP holds, the Relaxed Program is solved by requiring
that for all periods t, for ￿￿ almost all ￿t,
￿t
￿
￿t￿
2 arg max
xt2Xt
"
N X
i=0
uit (￿t;xt) ￿
N X
i=1
1
￿i1 (￿i1)
Jt
i1
￿
￿t
i
￿ @uit (￿t;xt)
@￿it
#
(20)
It is then easy to compare an allocation rule that satis￿es (20) with an e¢ cient allocation rule
￿￿, where, by de￿nition, for all periods t and ￿￿ almost all ￿t the latter is such that
￿￿
t
￿
￿t￿
2 arg max
xt2Xt
"
N X
i=0
uit (￿t;xt)
#
: (21)
For simplicity, focus on the case of a single agent: N = 1. First, note that when ￿1t is bounded
and either ￿1t = ￿1t or ￿1t = ￿1t, then by construction the information index Jt
11
￿
￿t
1
￿
= 0, and so
it is optimal to set ￿t
￿
￿t
1
￿
= ￿￿
t
￿
￿t
1
￿
. Intuitively, when only period-1 participation constraints are
relevant, the principal distorts the decisions only to reduce the agent￿ s period-1 information rents.
With time-separable utilities, distorting the allocations in period t is then useful only to the extent
that the type in period t is informationally linked to the type in period one. When the agent￿ s
type in period t coincides with either the highest or the lowest possible type for that period, the
informational link disappears, in which case there is no reason to distort the period-t decision. (In
a Markov model, in which Jt
11
￿
￿t
1
￿
= ￿t￿1
￿=1I￿+1
1￿
￿
￿￿+1
1
￿
, following ￿1t = ￿1t or ￿1t = ￿1t distortions
then vanish also in all subsequent periods, since the informational link with period 1 is severed).
It is interesting to contrast this ￿nding with the conclusions of Battaglini (2005), who studies a
single-agent model satisfying USEP and DNOT in which the agent￿ s type space in each period has
only two elements and where the evolution of the agent￿ s type is governed by a Markov process.
In his model, from the moment the agent￿ s type turns out to be high then the optimal mechanism
entails no distortions in all subsequent periods (this result is referred to as Generalized No Distortion
at the Top, or GNDT). Furthermore, the distortions that the agent experiences when his type
remains low are monotonically decreasing in time and vanish in the limit as T ! 1 (this result is
referred to as Vanishing Distortions at the Bottom, or VDB). As the analysis above suggests, while
the result of GNDT is quite robust in models satisfying DNOT and USEP, the result of VDB need
not be. In particular, distortions need not be monotonic neither in type nor in time and should
40not be expected to vanish in the long-run.29 On the other hand, for intermediate values of ￿1t,
distortions are determined by the interaction between the information index, J￿
it
￿
￿￿
i ;x￿￿1
i
￿
; and
the partial derivative of the ￿ ow utility uit (￿t;xt) with respect to ￿it: For example, suppose that,
in addition to the aforementioned assumptions, the following holds.
Assumption 13 (FOSD) First-Order Stochastic Dominance: For all i = 1;:::;N, all t = 2;:::;T,
all ￿it 2 ￿it;and all xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1
i ; the function Fit
￿
￿itj￿;xt￿1
i
￿
is nonincreasing in ￿t￿1
it .
Note that FOSD implies that the total informational indexes are nonnegative, i.e. J￿
it
￿
￿￿
i ;xt￿1
i
￿
￿
0; comparing the Relaxed Program (20) with the E¢ cient Program (21), one can then see that in
the Relaxed Program the principal distorts xt to reduce the partial derivative @uit (￿t;xt)=@￿it. In
the standard case in which xt is one-dimensional and the agent￿ s utility uit (￿t;xt) has the standard
single-crossing property, this partial derivative is reduced by reducing xt. Thus, the solution to the
Relaxed Program involves downward distortions in all periods t > 1 for intermediate types (and in
period t = 1 for all but the highest type). Intuitively, FOSD means that the type in each period
t > 1 is positively informationally linked to the period-1 type. Then, under the single-crossing
property, a downward distortion in the period￿t allocation, by reducing the agent￿ s information
rent in period t, then also reduces his information rent in period 1, thus raising the principal￿ s
expected payo⁄.
This result of downward distortions can be extended to settings that do not satisfy assumption
USEP and that have many agents, under the following generalization of the single-crossing property.
Assumption 14 (SCP) Single Crossing Property: for each t, Xt is a lattice and for each i =
1;:::;N, ui (￿;x) has increasing di⁄erences in (￿i;x):
The assumption that Xt is a lattice is reasonable with one agent. With many agents, it is
reasonable, say, if xt describes the provision of public goods, but it need not hold if xt is the
allocation of a private good (see footnote 21 above for both examples). The lattice structure on
each Xt induces a product lattice structure on the set X of all (measurable) decision rules.
Proposition 11 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 2 or
Proposition 7 hold, and ￿i1 > ￿1. Let X 0 ￿ X denote the set of decision rules solving the Relaxed
Program and X ￿ ￿ X denote the set of decision rules maximizing expected total surplus. Suppose
that, for all i = 0;:::;N, assumptions DNOT, FOSD, and SCP hold, and in addition,
(i) ui (￿;x) is supermodular in x,
(ii)
@ui(￿;x)
@￿it is submodular in x, for all t:
Then X 0 ￿ X ￿ in the strong set order.
29We refer the reader to our companion paper, Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2008), for a further discussion of the
dynamics of distortions in pro￿t-maximizing mechanisms.
41Proof. De￿ne g : X ￿ f￿1;0g ! R as
g (￿;z) ￿ E￿
"
N X
i=0
ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) + z
N X
i=1
1
￿i1(~ ￿i1)
T X
t=1
Jt
i1(~ ￿i)
@ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))
@￿it
#
:
Then g (￿;0) is the expected total surplus and g (￿;￿1) is the expected virtual surplus. (Assumption
DNOT ensures that the stochastic process ￿[￿] doesn￿ t depend on ￿ and that Jt
i1 (￿i;xi) does not
depend on xi, which is re￿ ected in the formula.) The assumption of FOSD ensures that Jt
i1
￿
~ ￿i
￿
￿ 0.
Together with SCP, this ensures that g has increasing di⁄erences in (￿;z). Together with (i) and
(ii), this ensures that g is supermodular in ￿. The result then follows from Topkis￿ s Theorem (see,
e.g., Topkis, 1998).
The result means that if ￿0 solves the relaxed problem and ￿￿ is e¢ cient, then the decision
rule
￿
￿0 _ ￿￿￿
t (￿) = ￿0
t (￿)_￿￿
t (￿) is e¢ cient and the decision rule
￿
￿0 ^ ￿￿￿
t (￿) = ￿0
t (￿)^￿￿
t (￿)
solves the relaxed problem. In particular, if ￿0 and ￿￿ are de￿ned uniquely with probability one,
then ￿0 (￿) ￿ ￿￿ (￿) with probability one.
Note that condition (ii) in Proposition 11 is a 3rd-derivative assumption. Also note that (i) and
(ii) hold trivially when each Xt is a chain (e.g., Xt ￿ R) and USEP holds.
4.7 Su¢ ciency and Robustness
We now turn to su¢ cient conditions for incentive compatibility. As anticipated in the introduction,
a complete characterization is evasive because of the multidimensional decision space of the problem.
Hereafter, we propose some su¢ cient conditions for a solution to the Relaxed Program to satisfy
all of the incentive and participation constraints that we believe can help in applications.
First we provide su¢ cient conditions for the participation constraints of all types above the
lowest type to be redundant.
Proposition 12 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 2 or
Proposition 7 hold, and that ￿i1 > ￿1. In addition, suppose that ui (￿;x) is increasing in each
￿it and that assumption FOSD holds. Then any mechanism h￿; i satisfying the lowest types￿
participation constraints (19) and the dynamic payo⁄ formula (15) for period one for all i; satis￿es
all the participation constraints (14).
Proof. Under the assumptions in the proposition, Jt
i1 (￿;￿(￿)) ￿ 0 and @ui (￿;x)=@￿it ￿ 0; hence,
by (15), V ￿i[￿; ] (￿i1) is nondecreasing in ￿i1.
Next, consider incentive constraints. In what follows we provide conditions ensuring not only
that a mechanism is ex-ante Bayesian incentive-compatible, but that it is also incentive compatible
42at all histories on the equilibrium path. That is, the value function of each agent i at any of his
truthful private history hi coincides with his equilibrium expected payo⁄:
V ￿i[￿; ] (hi) = E￿i[￿; ]jhi[ui(~ ￿; ~ x) ￿ ~ pi]:
This stronger version of incentive-compatibility thus guarantees that the allocation rule ￿ is imple-
mentable also under a stronger solution concept such as weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
First observe that, for any given allocation rule ￿, one can construct payment schemes   such
that the resulting utility that each agent obtains in equilibrium (i.e., under truthtelling by all agents)
satis￿es all the necessary conditions of (15): i.e., at any truthful history hi;t￿1 =
￿
￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i
￿
,
￿it(￿it;hi;t￿1) ￿ E￿i[￿; ]j(￿it;hi;t￿1)
h
ui(~ ￿; ~ x) ￿ ~ pi
i
is Lipschitz continuous in ￿it, and for a.e. ￿it,
@￿it(￿it;hi;t￿1)
@￿it
= E￿T
i [￿]j(￿it;hi;t￿1)
2
4
T X
￿=t
J￿
it
￿
~ ￿
￿
i ; ~ x￿￿1
i
￿ @ui
￿
~ ￿; ~ x
￿
@￿i￿
3
5:
(22)
(Recall that ￿T
i [￿]jhi denotes the probability distribution on ￿T ￿￿T
i ￿X induced by the allocation
rule ￿ when all agents other than i play truthful strategies, agent i￿ s private history is hi, and agent
i reports truthfully in the future.) To construct these payments, for all i, all (￿t
i;xt￿1
i ) 2 ￿t
i￿Xt￿1
i ,
and all mit 2 ￿it, let
D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);xt￿1
i ) ￿ E￿T
i [￿]j(￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);xt￿1
i )
"
T X
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J￿
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￿
i ; ~ x￿
i )
@ui(~ ￿; ~ x)
@￿i￿
#
: (23)
This function measures how agent i￿ s expected payo⁄ in period t changes with ￿it when the agent
reported truthfully at all preceding periods, he sends a (possibly untruthful) message mit in period
t and then reports truthfully at all subsequent periods. We then have the following result.
Lemma 4 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 2 or Propo-
sition 7 hold. Let h￿; i be any deterministic direct mechanism. Fix a period t. Consider the
payment scheme ^   obtained from h￿; i by setting for all i and all ￿ 2 ￿,
^  i (￿) =  i (￿) + ￿i
￿
￿t
i;￿t￿1
i (￿t￿1)
￿
, where
￿i
￿
￿t
i;xt￿1
i
￿
￿ E￿T
i [￿]j(￿t
i;￿t
i;xt￿1
i )
h
ui(~ ￿; ~ x) ￿  i
￿
~ ￿
￿i
￿
Z ￿it
^ ￿it
D
[￿]
i
￿￿
￿t￿1
i ;z
￿
;
￿
￿t￿1
i ;z
￿
;xt￿1
i
￿
dz
where ^ ￿it is any arbitrary value in [￿it;￿it]; with ^ ￿it > ￿it if ￿it = ￿1: Then for all i, and for
all truthful private histories hi;t￿1 = (￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) 2 Hi;t￿1, in period t the mechanism
D
￿; ^  
E
43satis￿es condition (22).
Proof. By construction, for all truthful private histories hi;t￿1 = (￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i );
E￿i[￿;^  ]j(￿it;hi;t￿1)[ui(~ ￿; ~ x) ￿ ~ pi] = E￿T
i [￿]j(￿t
i;￿t
i;xt￿1
i )[ui(~ ￿; ~ x) ￿  i(~ ￿)]
￿E￿T
i [￿]j(￿t
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i;xt￿1
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i;￿t￿1
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t￿1
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=
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^ ￿it
D
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i ((￿t￿1
i ;z);(￿t￿1
i ;z);xt￿1
i )dz;
The ￿rst equality follows from the fact that hi;t￿1 is truthful and the fact that ￿T
i [￿] corresponds to
the distribution over ￿T ￿ ￿T
i ￿ X under truthtelling (by all agents). The second equality follows
directly from the de￿nition of ￿i
￿
￿t
i;xt￿1
i
￿
. Note that the function D[￿] ￿￿
￿t￿1
i ;￿
￿
;
￿
￿t￿1
i ;￿
￿
;xt￿1
i
￿
is measurable and bounded and therefore integrable. Thus the mechanism
D
￿; ^  
E
satis￿es (22) in
period t.
Note that the construction achieves the satisfaction of condition (22) in period t by adding to
the original payment scheme  i (￿) a payment term that depends only on reports up to period t; by
implication, this construction does not a⁄ect the agents￿incentives in subsequent periods. Thus,
for any given allocation rule ￿, iterating the construction of the payments backward from period
T to period one yields a mechanism that, in any period, after any truthful history hi;t￿1 satis￿es
condition (22) for all i.
Now, using the payments constructed in Lemma 4, we provide a su¢ cient condition for the
allocation rule ￿ to be implementable, which is obtained by specializing Proposition 8 to quasilinear
environments.
Proposition 13 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumptions of either Proposition 2 or
Proposition 7 hold. Suppose the mechanism h￿; i is IC at any (possibly non-truthful) period t + 1
private history. If for all i, all (￿t
i;xt￿1
i ),
D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);xt￿1
i ) is nondecreasing in mit;
then there exists a payment rule ^   such that the mechanism
D
￿; ^  
E
is IC at (i) any truthful period
t private history, and (b) at any (possibly non-truthful) period t + 1 private history.
Proof. Let ^   be the payment rule that is obtained from h￿; i using the construction indicated in
the proof of Lemma 4. By construction, ^   preserves the agents￿incentives at all period t+1 histories.
Hence the mechanism
D
￿; ^  
E
satis￿es condition (iii) of Proposition 8. The payment scheme ^   also
ensures that, after any truthful private history hi;t￿1 =
￿
￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i
￿
; the mechanism
D
￿; ^  
E
44satis￿es condition (22) in period t. This establishes condition (i) of Proposition 8 for period t. The
assumption that D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);xt￿1
i ) is nondecreasing in mit then implies that condition (ii)
of Proposition 8 is also veri￿ed. The result then follows from Proposition 8.
To understand this result intuitively, ￿x a truthful history
￿
￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i
￿
, and let ￿t (￿it;mit)
denote agent i￿ s expected utility at this history as a function of his new type ￿it and his new report
mit. One can think of mit as a one-dimensional ￿allocation￿chosen by agent i in period t. Note that
@￿t (￿it;mit)=@￿it = D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);xt￿1
i ); because the mechanism h￿; i is IC at any (possibly
non-truthful) period t + 1 history, this follows from the dynamic payo⁄ formula (2) applied to the
modi￿ed mechanism in which agent i￿ s report of ￿it is ignored and replaced with the message mit. If
this expression is nondecreasing in mit, then ￿t has the single-crossing property (formally, increasing
di⁄erences). By standard static one-dimensional screening arguments, the monotonic ￿allocation
rule￿mit (￿it) = ￿it is then implementable (using payments constructed from the dynamic payo⁄
formula using the construction in Lemma 4).
The proposition cannot in general be iterated backward, since it assumes IC at all period t+1
histories but derives IC only at truthful period t histories. This re￿ ects a fundamental problem with
ensuring incentives in dynamic mechanisms: once an agent has lied once, he may ￿nd it optimal to
continue lying, and it is hard to characterize his continuation strategy. However, the proposition
can still be applied to some interesting special cases. In particular, in a Markov environment, an
agent￿ s true past types are irrelevant for incentives given his current type. This implies that IC at
truthful histories implies IC at all histories. Then the proposition can be rolled backward to show
that the mechanism is IC at all histories. This result also implies that truthful strategies, together
with the beliefs over the other agents￿types constructed from the mechanism h￿; i as rcpd as
indicated in subsection 4.3, form a weak PBE of the mechanism.
The result in Proposition 13 may also turn useful in certain non-Markov environments, as
illustrated in subsection 5.2 below.
The monotonicity of D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);xt￿1
i ) in mit can be interpreted as a weak monotonicity
condition of the allocation rule ￿: This is reminiscent of familiar results from static mechanism
design. In particular, when ui satis￿es the SCP and N = T = 1; the result in the proposition
coincides with the familiar monotonicity condition that ￿(mi1) be nondecreasing in mi1: However,
while in those environments, this condition is also necessary, this is not necessarily the case in
the more general environments considered here. To see this, continue to assume that N = 1; but
suppose now that T = 2. For simplicity, assume that there is no new information arriving in period
two so that j￿2j = 1: Then let
u(￿;x1;x2) = g(￿)x1 + f(￿)x2 + h(￿)x1x2 ￿
1
2
x2
1 ￿
1
2
x2
2;
45where, to ease the notation, we dropped all subscripts referring to agent i = 1. The functions f; g;
and h are real-valued functions satisfying the following conditions, for all ￿ 2 ￿ :
1. f(￿);g(￿);h(￿) < 0 with g(￿) + h(￿)f(￿) ￿ 0 and f(￿) + h(￿)g(￿) ￿ 0
2. jh(￿)j < 1
3. g0(￿);f0(￿);h0(￿) > 0
4. f0(￿) + h0(￿)g(￿) + h(￿)g0(￿) < 0:
Now assume X1 = X2 = R+ and notice that conditions 1-4 above guarantee that u(￿;x1;x2)
satis￿es the SCP and that, for any ￿; u(￿;￿) is quasiconcave and maximized at
￿1(￿) =
1
1 ￿ h(￿)2[g(￿) + h(￿)f(￿)] and ￿2(￿) =
1
1 ￿ h(￿)2[f(￿) + h(￿)g(￿)]: (24)
It is then immediate that the allocation rule ￿(￿) = (￿1(￿);￿2(￿)) is implementable. Next note that,
in this example, weak monotonicity is equivalent to requiring that the function
D[￿](￿;m) = g0(￿)￿1(m) + f0(￿)￿2(m) + h0(￿)￿1(m)￿2(m)
be nondecreasing in m: It is then easy to see that there exist functions f; g and h such that
the corresponding allocation rule ￿(￿) as de￿ned in (24) fails this condition, thus illustrating the
non-necessity of weak monotonicity.
Finally note that Proposition 13 can also be used to analyze the e⁄ects of disclosing information
to the agents in the course of the mechanism in addition to the minimal one, as captured by xit. Such
disclosure can be captured formally by introducing a measurable space Xd
it of possible disclosures
to agent i in period t, and then considering the extended set ^ Xit = Xit￿Xd
it, so that ^ xit =
￿
xit;xd
it
￿
.
While the payo⁄ and the stochastic process describing the evolution of agent i￿ s type continues to
depend on ^ xit only through xit, the role of xd
it is to capture the additional information that the
mechanism discloses to agent i about the other agents￿reports (and hence about the decisions x￿it).
The result in Proposition 13 can then be extended to this environment by rede￿ning D
[￿]
i so that
the expectation in (23) is now made conditional on ^ xit =
￿
xit;xd
it
￿
instead of just xit. Clearly, the
monotonicity condition in the proposition is harder to satisfy when more information is disclosed,
but it may still be possible.
In particular, we can formulate a simple condition on the allocation rule that ensures robustness
to an extreme form of disclosure. Namely, suppose that each agent i somehow learns at the
beginning of period t (i.e. before sending his period-t report) all the other agents￿types ￿￿i (note
that this includes past, current and future ones). Formally, this can be captured through a disclosure
46xd
it = ￿￿i. We then say that the mechanism is Other-Ex-Post IC (OEP-IC) if truthtelling remains
an optimal strategy in this mechanism at any history. It turns out that some allocation rules can
be implemented in an OEP-IC mechanism, under some additional assumptions.
Assumption 15 (PDPD) Payo⁄s Depend on Private Decisions: for each i = 1;:::;N; ui (￿;x)
depends on x only through xi .
Corollary 1 Suppose that, for each i = 1;:::;N, the assumption of either Proposition 2 or Propo-
sition 7 hold. Suppose in addition that assumptions DNOT, FOSD, SCP and PDPD hold and that
the mechanism h￿; i is OEP-IC at any (possibly non-truthful) period t + 1 private history. If for
all i and all ￿ ￿ t,
￿i￿ (￿￿) is nondecreasing in (￿it;:::;￿i￿) for all ￿t￿1
i ;￿￿
￿i; (25)
then there exists a payment rule ^   such that the mechanism
D
￿; ^  
E
is OEP-IC at (i) any truthful
period t private history, and (ii) at any (possibly non-truthful) period t + 1 private history.
Proof. Under assumption DNOT, the stochastic process ￿[￿] over ￿ does not depend on the
allocation rule ￿ and hence can be written as ￿. Furthermore, because types are independent, then
￿ is the product of each individual agent i￿ s stochastic process over ￿T
i , which henceforth we denote
by ￿i. For any ￿t
i; we then denote by ￿ij￿t
i the distribution over ￿T
i given ￿t
i:
The payment rule ^   is obtained by adapting the construction of Lemma 4 to the situation where
agent i has observed ￿￿i and faces a stochastic process ￿i over his own types (which is essentially
a single-agent situation):
^  i (￿) =  i (￿) + ￿i
￿
￿t
i;￿￿i
￿
, where
￿i
￿
￿t
i;￿￿i
￿
= E￿ij￿t
i
h
ui(~ ￿i;￿￿i;￿
￿
~ ￿i;￿￿i
￿
) ￿  i
￿
~ ￿i;￿￿i
￿i
￿
Z ￿it
^ ￿it
D
[￿]
i
￿
(￿t￿1
i ;z);(￿t￿1
i ;z);￿￿i
￿
dz;
where ^ ￿it is any arbitrary value in [￿it;￿it]; with ^ ￿it > ￿it if ￿it = ￿1; and where
D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);￿￿i) ￿ E￿ij￿t
i
"
T X
￿=t
J￿
it(~ ￿
￿
i )
@ui((~ ￿i;￿￿i);￿((mit;~ ￿i;￿t);￿￿i))
@￿i￿
#
:
Note that, under assumption DNOT, J￿
it (￿;xi) does not depend on xi. By FOSD, J￿
it (￿) ￿ 0. By
SCP, PDPD, and (25), @ui (￿;￿((mit;￿i;￿t);￿￿i))=@￿i￿ is nondecreasing in mit for all ￿￿i. This
implies that D
[￿]
i (￿t
i;(￿t￿1
i ;mit);￿￿i) is nondecreasing in mit for all ￿t
i and all ￿￿i. The result then
follows from Proposition 13 applied to this setting.
47For example, in a Markov environment, backward iteration of the Corollary implies that under
its assumptions, any allocation rule that is ￿strongly monotone￿in the sense that each ￿it
￿
￿t
i;￿t
￿i
￿
is
nondecreasing in ￿t
i for any given ￿t
￿i (which Matthews and Moore (1987) call ￿attribute monotonic-
ity￿ ) is implementable in an OEP-IC mechanism, and therefore in an BIC mechanism under any
possible information disclosure. While it should be clear from Proposition 13 that strong monotonic-
ity is not necessary for implementability, it is particularly easy to check it in applications and it
does ensure nice robustness to any kind of information disclosure in the mechanism. Subsections
5.1.2 and 5.2 provide examples of applications where the pro￿t-maximizing allocation rule turns
out to be strongly monotone.
Remark 2 At this point, the reader may wonder whether we could also ensure robustness to an
agent observing his own future types from the outset. This is not likely. Indeed, if agent i observes
all of his types from the outset, his IC would be characterized as in a multidimensional screening
problem. It is well known that incentives are harder to ensure in this setting. For example, in
the special case with a single agent with linear utility u(￿;x) =
T X
t=1
￿txt, a necessary condition for
implementability of allocation rule ￿ is the ￿Law of Supply￿
T X
t=1
￿
￿t
￿
￿0￿
￿ ￿t (￿)
￿￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
￿
￿ 0 for all ￿0;￿ 2 ￿:
Because the pro￿t-maximizing allocation rules derived in applications typically fail to satisfy this
condition, one cannot obtain robustness to the agents￿observations of their own future types ￿for
free.￿ Thus, while some authors have drawn analogies between dynamic mechanism design and
static multidimensional mechanism design problems (see, e.g., Courty and Li, 2000 and Rochet
and Stole, 2003), here we highlight an important di⁄erence: signi￿cantly more allocation rules are
implementable in a dynamic setting in which the agents learn (and report) the dimensions of their
types sequentially over time than in a static setting in which they observe (and report) all dimensions
at once.
Remark 3 The reader may also wonder whether there are simple conditions on the payo⁄s and the
kernels that ensure that the allocation rule solving the Relaxed Program 18 is strongly monotone.
Unfortunately, any such conditions would have to be restrictive. Indeed, recall from Subsection 4.6
that in a separable environment (i.e. under USEP) at any period t > 1, the distortion in xit is
determined by the information index Jt
i1(￿t
i) which need not be monotonic in ￿it; in particular, when
￿it is bounded, the distortion is zero at both ￿it = ￿it and ￿it = ￿it and downward at intermediate
￿it. Thus, because of this nonmonotonic downward distortion, we can have ￿it
￿
￿it;￿t￿1
i ;￿t
￿i
￿
<
￿
￿
￿it;￿t￿1
i ;￿t
￿i
￿
for some ￿it > ￿it. Indeed, it is to ensure that the solution to the Relaxed Program
48is implementable that Eso and Szentes (2007) make their Assumption 1 that amounts to requiring
that J2
i1(￿i1;￿i2) is nondecreasing in ￿i2. However, note that with a bounded type space ￿i2, this
assumption can be satis￿ed only when the information index is identically zero so that ￿i1 and ￿i2
are independent. In the applications below we will consider AR(k) processes with unbounded type
spaces in which case the information indices are constant￿ this helps ensuring strong monotonicity
of the solution to the Relaxed Program.
5 Applications
We now show how the results in the previous sections can be put to work by examining a few
applications where the agents￿types evolve according to linear AR(k) processes. First, we consider a
class of problems in which the optimal mechanism takes the form of a quasi-e¢ cient, or handicapped,
mechanism where distortions depend only on the agents￿￿rst period types. Next, we consider
environments where payo⁄s separate over time as it is often assumed in applications.
5.1 Handicapped mechanisms
Consider an environment where in each period the set of feasible allocations is Xt ￿ RN+1. The
utility to each agent i = 1;:::;N (gross of payments) is
ui (￿;x) =
T X
t=1
￿itxit ￿ ci (x); (26)
where ci : R(N+1)T ! R can be interpreted an intertemporal cost function. The principal￿ s (gross)
payo⁄ is u0 (￿;x) = v0(x). Note that the cost functions ci and the principal￿ s payo⁄ v0 need
not be time-separable; this permits us to accommodate dynamic aspects such as intertemporal
capacity constraints, habit formation, and learning-by-doing. The private information of each
agent i = 1;:::;N is assumed to evolve according to a linear AR(k) process, as in Example 4. The
total information indices Jt
i1 (￿;x) are thus independent of (￿;x) and coincide with the ￿impulse
response functions￿ Jt
i1 for the AR(k) process. We assume that the support of the ￿rst period
innovation "i1 (and hence that of ￿i1) is bounded from below.
In this environment, the expected dynamic virtual surplus takes the form
E￿
"
v0
￿
￿(~ ￿)
￿
+
N X
i=1
"
T X
t=1
￿
~ ￿it￿it(~ ￿
t
) ￿ Jt
i1￿￿1
i1 (~ ￿i1)￿it(~ ￿
t
)
￿
￿ ci
￿
￿(~ ￿)
￿
##
:
Note that the latter coincides with the expected total surplus in a model where the (gross) payo⁄
49to each agent i is ui(￿;x) and where the (gross) payo⁄ to the principal is
^ v0(￿;x) ￿ v0(x) ￿
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
Jt
i1￿￿1
i1 (￿i1)xit:
This implies that the solution to the Relaxed Program can be obtained by solving an e¢ ciency-
maximization program where the principal has an extra marginal cost Jt
i1￿￿1
i1 (￿i1) of allocating a
unit to agent i in period t. In general, this program can be a fairly complex dynamic programming
problem. However, in many applications, its solution can be readily found using existing methods.
What is important to us is the following observation. Assuming the period-one types are reported
truthfully, then any allocation rule that maximizes the expected dynamic virtual can be sustained
through an ￿Handicapped￿ e¢ cient mechanism. In period 1 each agent i sends a message mi1
determining his handicaps Jt
i1￿￿1
i1 (mi1). The game that starts in period two then corresponds to
a private-value environment where each agent i￿ s payo⁄, for i = 1;:::;N; is as in (26), whereas
agent 0￿ s payo⁄(i.e. the principal￿ s) is ^ v0(￿;x): Because the decisions that are implemented are the
e¢ cient decisions for this environment and because this virtual environment is a private-value one,
incentives at any period t ￿ 2 can be provided using for example the ￿Team payments￿(Athey
and Segal, 2007) de￿ned, for all ￿; by
 i(￿) =
X
j6=i
uj(￿;￿(￿));
for all i = 1;::::n, where j 6= i includes also j = 0: We then have the following result (the proof
follows directly from the arguments above).30
Proposition 14 In the environment with AR(k) types described above, any allocation rule that
maximizes the expected dynamic virtual surplus can be implemented in a mechanism that satis￿es
IC at all truthful histories in periods t ￿ 2.
Incentives in the ￿rst period must be checked application-by-application.31 For example,
incentive-compatibility in period one can be easily guaranteed if the costs ci are identically equal
to zero for all i and if v0(x) is time-separable￿ the environment then becomes a special case of the
class considered in the next subsection.
30What is important for the result in the next proposition is that (i) the payo⁄ of each agent i depends only on
￿i and that the derivatives of ui with respect to each ￿it are independent of ￿i; (ii) that the principal￿ s payo⁄ is
independent of ￿; and that (iii) the total information indexes are independent of ￿:
31In period 1; the model where the principal has payo⁄ ^ v0(￿;x) is one with interdependent values since ^ v0(￿;x)
depends on the agents￿true period-1 types through the hazard rates ￿i1(￿i1). Hence, the implementability of a virtu-
ally e¢ cient allocation rule cannot be guaranteed directly by using Team payments, for the latter induce truthtelling
only with private values.
505.1.1 Selling once
An example of a non-time-separable environment where incentive-compatibility can be guaranteed
also in period one is the following. Let N = 1, Xt = f0;1g for t = 1;:::;T, and c1 ￿ 0. The agent￿ s
type ￿t evolves according to an AR(1) process with coe¢ cient ￿ 2 (0;1).32 The ￿rst period type is
distributed on ￿1 := (￿1;￿1) according to a c.d.f. F1 with density f1(￿) strictly positive on ￿1 and
hazard rate ￿1(￿1) nondecreasing in ￿1. The principal￿ s (gross) payo⁄ is given by
v0(x) =
(
￿
PT
t=1 cxt if
PT
t=1 xt ￿ 1,
￿1 if
PT
t=1 xt > 1.
The interpretation is that the principal is a seller who has one unit of a good and must decide when
to sell it to a buyer whose valuation evolves over time. The dynamic virtual surplus then takes the
form
E￿
"
T X
t=1
￿t(~ ￿)[~ ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1￿￿1
1 (~ ￿1)] + v0(￿(~ ￿))
#
:
De￿nition 12 An allocation rule ￿ is a handicapped cut-o⁄ rule if there exist a constant z1 2
cl￿1, and nonincreasing functions zt : ￿1 ! R[f￿1;+1g, t = 2;:::;T, such that for all ￿ 2 ￿,
￿1(￿) =
(
1 if ￿1 ￿ z1,
0 if ￿1 < z1,
and for t > 1,
￿t(￿) =
(
1 if ￿t ￿ zt(￿1) and
Pt￿1
￿=1 ￿￿(￿) = 0,
0 otherwise.
Note that handicapped cut-o⁄ rules are not strongly monotone. Nevertheless, such rules are
implementable.
Proposition 15 Consider the environment described above. Any handicapped cut-o⁄ rule ￿ is
implementable in a mechanism that is IC at all histories. Furthermore, there exists a handicapped
cuto⁄ rule that solves the relaxed problem.
The implementability of handicapped cut-o⁄rules follows directly from the result in Proposition
13. It is in fact easy to see that, under these rules
D[￿](￿t;(￿t￿1;mt)) = E￿j￿t
"
T X
￿=t
￿￿￿t￿￿(￿t￿1;mt;~ ￿t+1;:::;~ ￿￿)
#
32Because there is no risk of confusion, in this example we simplify notation by dropping the subscripts i = 1 from
all variables.
51is nondecreasing in mt : note a higher message in period t either has no e⁄ect on the allocation
of the good, or it anticipates the time at which the good is sold thus increasing D[￿]: Together
with the fact that the environment is Markov this property then implies that one can construct
payments that induce the agent to report truthfully at all histories. The following payment schemes
implement handicapped cut-o⁄ rules. The buyer is o⁄ered a menu of contracts, indexed by ￿1:
Each contract entails an up-front payment P(￿1) together with an additional payment, to be paid
at the time the good is sold, equal to pt = c + ￿t￿1￿￿1
1 (￿1): The buyer then chooses when to
buy, knowing that multiple sales are not permitted. Equivalently, the buyer can be allowed to
purchase multiple times by charging him a total payment (in addition to the up-front one) equal
to
PT
t=1 xt[￿t￿1￿￿1
1 (￿1)] + v0(x). The up-front payment is then computed using Lemma 4.
Next, consider the optimality of handicapped cut-o⁄ rules. Notice that, in this environment,
the e¢ cient rule￿ i.e. the policy ￿￿ that maximizes total surplus E￿
hPT
t=1 ￿t(~ ￿)~ ￿t + v0(￿(~ ￿))
i
￿ is
a cut-o⁄ policy with cuto⁄s fz￿
tgT
t=1 determined recursively by the indi⁄erence conditions z￿
t ￿ c =
E￿jz￿
t
h
v￿
t+1(~ ￿t+1)
i
; where33
v￿
t+1(￿t+1) ￿ max
n
￿t+1 ￿ c; E￿j￿t+1
h
v￿
t+2(~ ￿t+2)
io
denotes the value of not selling in period t, conditional on not having sold in past periods. That
the policy that solves the relaxed program is also a cut-o⁄ rule with cuto⁄s depending only on ￿1
is then immediate given the structure of the dynamic virtual surplus. The cuto⁄s in the optimal
mechanism are determined as in the e¢ cient rule by augmenting the principal￿ s cost in each period
t by the handicap ￿t￿1￿￿1
1 (￿1):
5.1.2 Learning through consumption
Another example of an environment in which the optimal mechanism takes the form of an hand-
icapped mechanism and in which incentive-compatibility can be guaranteed also in period one is
the following. A seller faces a buyer who learns his valuation over time through consumption. This
situation arises for example in the market for new experience goods (such as prescription drugs)
and in expert services (such as a chiropractor￿ s service). In each period t = 1;:::;T a single seller
can produce an (indivisible) service at cost c. There is a single buyer whose valuation for the service
is v.
Neither the buyer nor the seller knows v. The buyer￿ s prior belief is that v ￿ N
￿
￿1; 1
￿
￿
, where
￿1 is the mean and ￿ the precision (i.e., the inverse of the variance). The seller knows that the
buyer￿ s prior belief is Normal with precision ￿ but does not know the mean ￿1 of the buyer￿ s prior
33With an abuse of notation, here we denote by ￿jz
￿
t the probability measure over ￿t+1 given that ￿t = z
￿
t :
52belief. The seller believes that ￿1 is distributed on [￿1;￿ ￿1) according to some absolutely continuous
c.d.f. F1 with F0
1 > 0. We assume that the hazard rate ￿1 (￿1) of F1 is nondecreasing. If the buyer
consumes the service in period t (i.e., if xt = 1), he then receives a signal st = v +"t, "t ￿ N(0; 1
￿),
where ￿ is the precision of the signal. The noises "t are i.i.d. and independent of v. If the buyer does
not consume in period t, he does not receive any new information about v.34 Using the properties of
the Normal distribution, the evolution of the buyer￿ s beliefs can be expressed recursively as follows
(see, e.g., DeGroot, 2004). For any xt, let
￿
￿xt￿
￿ ￿
Pt
￿=1 x￿ denote the number of times the buyer
consumed the service in periods 1;:::;t. The buyer￿ s posterior belief about v at the beginning of
period t = 1;:::;T is then Normal with mean
￿t ￿
￿￿1 + ￿
P
j2f￿:￿<t^x￿=1g sj
￿ + kxt￿1k￿
and precision ￿t = ￿ +
￿ ￿xt￿1￿ ￿￿: Depending on whether the buyer consumed or not the good in
period t￿1, we then have two cases. If xt￿1 = 0, then ￿t = ￿t￿1 and ￿t = ￿t￿1: If instead xt￿1 = 1,
then
￿t =
￿￿1 + ￿
P
j2f￿:￿<t￿1^x￿=1g sj + ￿st￿1
￿ + kxt￿1k￿
=
￿t￿1￿t￿1 + ￿st￿1
￿t￿1 + ￿
and ￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿ = ￿ +
￿
￿xt￿1￿
￿￿; where ￿t￿1 = ￿ +
￿
￿xt￿2￿
￿￿: Note that ￿t is a weighted average
of the period t ￿ 1 posterior ￿t￿1 and the period t ￿ 1 signal st￿1. Thus, before the signal st￿1 is
realized, we have that
￿tj(￿t￿1;xt￿2;xt￿1 = 1) ￿ N
￿
￿t￿1;
￿
(￿ + kxt￿1k￿)(￿ + kxt￿2k￿)
￿
;
and
￿tj(￿t￿1;xt￿2;xt￿1 = 0) = ￿t￿1:
These expressions de￿ne Markov kernels Ft(￿j￿t￿1;xt￿1), where the sequence of past allocations
determines the precision.
Now, assume that payo⁄s are quasilinear and take the form of
P
t(pt ￿ xtct) for the seller and
P
t(xt￿t ￿ pt) for the buyer, where xt 2 f0;1g = Xt.
We ￿rst show that in terms of payo⁄s it is without loss to restrict attention to a subclass of
allocation rules.
De￿nition 13 An allocation rule ￿ is a stopping rule if, for all t, all s > t and all ￿ 2 ￿,
￿t(￿t) = 0 implies ￿s(￿s) = 0. The set of stopping rules is denoted X S.
34See also Nazerzadeh, Saberi, and Vohra (2008) for a similar environment.
53Lemma 5 Consider the learning environment described above. If h￿; i is an ex-ante IC mech-
anism, then there exists an ex-ante IC mechanism
D
^ ￿; ^  
E
such that ^ ￿ is a stopping rule and the
expected payo⁄s of both the buyer and the seller under
D
^ ￿; ^  
E
are the same as under h￿; i.
The lemma is similar to the well-known result that in a two-armed bandit problem with one safe
arm the optimal strategy is a stopping rule. Given this result, in what follows we restrict attention
to stopping rules. Then the only relevant period-t histories are the ones in which the agent has
consumed in all the preceding periods. Thus we can replace
￿
￿xt￿
￿ in all the formulas above by t. In
particular, before stopping, we have that
￿t+1j￿t ￿ N
￿
￿t;
￿
(￿ + t￿)[￿ + (t ￿ 1)￿]
￿
:
Denoting the standard deviation of the period t + 1 posterior by ￿t+1 ￿
p
￿[(￿ + t￿)(￿ + (t ￿
1)￿]￿1=2 we can then express the kernels as Ft+1(￿t+1j￿t;xt) = ￿
￿
￿t+1￿￿t
￿t+1
￿
, where ￿ is the c.d.f.
of the standard normal distribution. Thus, before stopping, the model satis￿es the assumptions of
Proposition 2 and the direct information index between any two adjacent periods is simply
It+1
t (￿t+1) = ￿
@Ft+1
￿
￿t+1j￿t;xt￿
=@￿t
ft+1(￿t+1j￿t;xt)
= ￿
@￿
￿
￿t+1￿￿t
￿t+1
￿
=@￿t
1
￿t+1￿
￿
￿t+1￿￿t
￿t+1
￿ = 1;
where ￿ is the density of the standard normal distribution. Since the model is Markovian, I￿
t ￿ 0
for ￿ > t + 1. Hence, before stopping, we have J￿
t ￿ 1 for all ￿ and t. The maximization of the
dynamic virtual surplus then takes the form
max
￿2XS E￿[￿]
"
T X
t=1
￿t(~ ￿
t
)
￿
~ ￿t ￿ c ￿
1
￿1 (￿1)
￿#
;
where the maximization is over the set of stopping rules X S.
This problem cannot be solved by pointwise maximization because it is a stopping problem.
Instead, we proceed by backward induction. While it is di¢ cult to get a close-form solution for the
optimal allocation rule, it is possible to characterize it partially and get a clean comparison to the
e¢ cient allocation rule.
De￿nition 14 A stopping rule ￿ 2 X S is a cuto⁄ rule if for all t and all ￿t￿1, ￿t(￿t￿1;￿t) is
nondecreasing in ￿t. The cuto⁄s are given by zt(￿t￿1) ￿ inf
￿
￿t 2 ￿t : ￿t(￿t￿1;￿t) = 1
￿
.
Proposition 16 Consider the learning environment described above. The following are true:
54(1) The e¢ cient allocation rule ￿￿ is a cuto⁄ rule where for all t and all ￿t￿1, the cuto⁄
z￿
t(￿t￿1) ￿ z￿
t is independent of ￿t￿1 and nondecreasing in t.
(2) The allocation rule that solves the Relaxed Program is a cuto⁄ rule ￿ where for all t and all
￿t￿1, the cuto⁄ zt(￿t￿1) ￿ zt(￿1) is independent of ￿t￿1
￿1 , nondecreasing in t, and nonincreasing in
￿1.
(3) For all t and all ￿1, zt(￿1) ￿ z￿
t. In particular, together with (4) this implies that a pro￿t
maximizing monopoly experiments less than what is socially desirable.
(4) Both the allocation rule that solves the Relaxed Program ￿ and the e¢ cient rule ￿￿ are
implementable.
That the pro￿t-maximizing cuto⁄s are increasing in t is due to the fact that the option value
of learning is decreasing in the number of times the service has been provided. First, the impact
of each new signal on the buyer￿ s posterior belief declines with the number of signals received in
the past. Second, as the remaining horizon gets shorter, the seller will reap the bene￿ts from high
valuations in fewer periods.
Perhaps more interestingly, the cuto⁄s in the pro￿t-maximizing allocation rule depend on the
buyer￿ s ￿rst-period type. This implies that the optimal selling mechanism cannot be implemented
with a sequence of prices. Actually, even history-dependent prices fail to implement the optimal
mechanism. In fact, what is essential is to condition the prices not on the purchase history xt￿1 but
on the ￿rst period type ￿1. This can be done by o⁄ering the buyer a menu of contracts, where each
contract corresponds to a di⁄erent price path. Because the optimal cuto⁄s are increasing in time,
so are the prices in each path. To build demand, the monopolist thus optimally o⁄ers ￿introductory
rates,￿or ￿discounts,￿that expire after the service has been provided for a few periods.
5.2 Time-Separable Environments
We now consider environments in which the agents￿types continue to follow an AR(k) process as
in Example 4, but where payo⁄s separate over time. The set of possible decisions in each period t
is Xt ￿ RN+1. Each agent i (with the principal as agent 0) has an utility function of the form
ui (￿;x) =
T X
t=1
uit(￿it;xit);
with the principal￿ s types ￿0t being common knowledge. As in the previous subsection, the support
of the ￿rst period types is assumed to be bounded from below.
This model can ￿t many applications including sequential auctions, procurement, and regula-
tion.
55Proposition 17 Consider the separable environment with AR(k) types described above. Suppose
the assumptions of Proposition 2 hold for each agent i = 1;:::;N. Suppose further that for all i =
0;:::;N and all periods t, the following are true: (1) the periodic utility function uit has increasing
di⁄erences in (￿it;xit); (2) the coe¢ cient ￿it of the AR(k) process is nonnegative; (3) the ￿rst-period
hazard rate ￿i1 (￿i1) is nondecreasing; and (4) the partial derivative
@uit(￿it;xit)
@￿it is nonnegative and
submodular in (￿it;xit). Then an allocation rule ￿ can be part of a pro￿t-maximizing mechanism if
and only if, for all t, and ￿-almost all ￿t,
￿t(￿t) 2 argmax
xt
(
u0t(￿0t;x0t) +
N X
i=1
￿
uit(￿it;xit) ￿
Jt
i1
￿i1 (￿i1)
@uit(￿it;xit)
@￿it
￿)
: (27)
Furthermore, ￿ can be implemented in a mechanism that is OEP-IC at any history using payments
constructed as follows. For any agent i = 1;:::;n and all ￿,
 i(￿) =  i1(￿i1;￿T
￿i) +
T X
t=2
 it(￿1;￿t); (28)
where for all t ￿ 2,
 it(￿1;￿t) ￿ uit(￿it;￿it(￿1;￿t)) ￿
Z ￿it
￿it
@uit(r;￿it(￿1;(r;￿￿i;t)))
@￿it
dr; (29)
and35
 i1(￿i1;￿T
￿i) ￿ E￿ij￿i1
"
ui((~ ￿
T
i ;￿T
￿i);￿(~ ￿
T
i ;￿T
￿i)) ￿
T X
t=2
 it(￿1;(~ ￿it;￿￿i;t))
#
(30)
￿
Z ￿i1
￿i1
E￿ijr
"
T X
￿=1
J￿
i1
@ui(~ ￿i;￿i((r;~ ￿i;￿1);￿T
￿i))
@￿i￿
#
dr:
The result in Proposition 17 follows essentially from Corollary 1 by observing that in this
environment incentives separate over time. By inspecting (27) one can in fact see that the allocation
rule that maximizes the expected dynamic virtual surplus has the property that in each period t
the allocation ￿t(￿t) depends only on the current reports ￿t and on the agents￿period-1 reports ￿1.
This in turn is a consequence of the following assumptions: (i) preferences are separable over time
(USEP), (ii) decisions do not a⁄ect types (DNOT), and (iii) informational indexes Jt
i￿ do not depend
on the realized types, as it is the case with AR(k) processes. The problem that each agent i faces at
any period t ￿ 2 when he must choose which report to send then becomes a static problem (despite
35Recall that the notation ￿ij￿
t
i denotes the unique probability measure on ￿
T
i that corresponds to the stochastic
process that starts in period one with ￿i1 and whose transitions are given by the kernels of the AR(k) process.
56the informational channel that links types together over time). However, the fact that incentives
separate over time alone does not guarantee implementability. As it is known from the literature
on static mechanism design, one also needs ￿enough monotonicity￿in the allocation rule ￿t(￿1;￿t)
with respect to the reports of own types. Assumptions (1), (2) and (4) in the proposition (which
imply SCP, FOSD, and PDPD) guarantee that each ￿it(￿1;￿t) is monotone in ￿it. Constructing
payments that induce the agents to report truthfully at any period t ￿ 2; even after they observe
the other agents￿types36, is then particularly simple. It su¢ ces to have each agent i pay in each
period t ￿ 2 a transfer  it(￿1;￿t) that, given (￿1;￿￿it); coincides with the payment type ￿it would
made in a static mechanism implementing the monotone allocation rule ￿it(￿;￿1;￿￿it), as indicated
in (29).
As for period one, in general providing incentives at t = 1 is di¢ cult. However, note that as-
sumptions (1)-(4) in the proposition guarantee that the allocation rule that maximizes the dynamic
virtual surplus is strongly monotone in the sense of Corollary 1. Following the same steps as in
the proof of Corollary 1, one can then add to the payments  it(￿1;￿t)￿ which for convenience can
be assumed to be made in each of the corresponding periods￿ a ￿nal payment of  i1(￿i1;￿T
￿i) to
be made in period T; after all other agents￿types ￿T
￿i have been revealed. When the payments
 i1(￿i1;￿T
￿i) are as in (30) then incentives for truthtelling are guaranteed also in period one.
Finally consider possible implementations of the pro￿t-maximizing rule. First, note that in
the linear case (i.e., when uit(￿it;xit) = ￿itxit) the implementation is particularly simple. Suppose
there is no allocation in the ￿rst period and assume the agents do not observe the other agents￿
types (both assumptions simplify the discussion but are not essential for the argument). In period
one, each agent i chooses from a menu of ￿handicaps￿(Jt
i1￿￿1
i1 (￿i1))T
t=1, indexed by ￿i1: Then in
each period t ￿ 2, a ￿handicapped￿VCG mechanism is played with transfers as in (29). Lastly,
in period T + 1, each agent is asked to make a ￿nal payment of  i1(￿i1;~ ￿
T
￿i) (Eso and Szentes
(2007) derive this result in the special case of a two-period model with allocation only in the second
period.) This logic extends to nonlinear payo⁄s in the sense that in the ￿rst period the agents still
choose from a menu of future plans (indexed by the ￿rst period type). In the subsequent periods
the distortions now generally depend also on the current reports through the partial derivatives
@uit(￿it;xit)
@￿it . However intermediate reports (i.e., reports in periods 2;:::;t ￿ 1) remain irrelevant
both for the period-t allocation and for the period-t payments.
36In fact, due to time-separability, in periods t ￿ 2 the mechanism is truly ex post IC in that it is robust also to
the possibility that aech agent i observes his own future types.
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60Appendices
A Statement and proof of Lemma A.1
Lemma A.1. Assume the environment satis￿es Assumption 2. Then Assumption 5 implies that
for any t; and any ￿ < t
9B < +1 :
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
@
@￿￿
E[￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1]
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ B 8(￿t￿1;yt￿1):
Proof of Lemma A.1. Assumption 5 implies that
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
@
@￿￿
Z
￿tdFt(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
lim
￿0
￿!￿￿
R
￿td[Ft(￿tj￿t￿1
￿￿ ;￿0
￿;yt￿1) ￿ Ft(￿tj￿t￿1
￿￿ ;￿￿;yt￿1)]
￿0
￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
=
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ lim
￿0
￿!￿￿
Z
Ft(￿tj￿t￿1
￿￿ ;￿0
￿;yt￿1) ￿ Ft(￿tj￿t￿1
￿￿ ;￿￿;yt￿1)
￿0
￿ ￿ ￿￿
d￿t
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
=
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿
Z
@Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)
@￿￿
d￿t
￿
￿ ￿
￿;
The second inequality follows by Lemma 6 below. The last equality follows by the dominated
convergence theorem since the integrand is bounded for all ￿t by the integrable function Bt(￿t).
Furthermore, ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
Z
@Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)
@￿￿
d￿t
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Z
B(￿t)d￿t;
from which the claim follows by taking B ￿
R
B(￿t)d￿t:
B Proof of Proposition 1
Two kinds of period-t histories appear frequently in the proof. Those including the message mt but
excluding the realization of yt, and those including the current type ￿t but excluding the message
mt. For expositional clarity we introduce notation to distinguish the value functions associated
with these two types of histories. For the ￿rst kind, we let ￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿1￿
￿ V ￿(￿t;mt;yt￿1)
denote the the supremum continuation expected utility. For the second kind, we continue to use the
value function V ￿ but in order to clarify notation further we drop the superscript ￿ and add a time
subscript. Thus we write Vt(￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1) ￿ V ￿(￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1). Also, it is convenient to introduce
period T +1 as a notional device and then let ￿T+1
￿
￿T+1;mT+1;y
￿
= VT+1
￿
￿T+1;m;y
￿
= U (￿;y).
61Note that by de￿nition
￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿1￿
=
Z
Vt+1
￿
￿t+1;mt;yt￿
dFt+1
￿
￿t+1j￿t;yt￿
d￿t
￿
ytjmt;yt￿1￿
; (31)
Vt+1
￿
￿t+1;mt;yt￿
= sup
mt+1
￿t+1
￿
￿t+1;
￿
mt;mt+1
￿
;yt￿
:
The proof proceeds in a series of Lemmas.
Lemma 6 For any Lipschitz function G : ￿t ! R,
Z
G(￿t)dFt(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿
Z
G(￿t)dFt(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)
= ￿
Z
G0(￿t)
￿
Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)
￿
d￿t;
where all the integrals exist.
Proof. First note that the ￿rst two integrals exist, since letting M be the Lipschitz constant for
G, and picking any ^ ￿t 2 ￿t, we can write jG(￿t)j ￿
￿
￿ ￿G
￿
^ ￿t
￿￿
￿
￿ + M
￿
￿ ￿^ ￿t
￿
￿ ￿ + M j￿tj, and all terms
have expectations with respect to the probability distribution dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
, the last term by
Assumption 2. Thus, we can use integration by parts to write
Z
G(￿t)dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿
Z
G(￿t)dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
=
Z
G(￿t)d
￿
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿
= ￿
Z
G0 (￿t)
￿
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿
d￿t
+
￿
G(￿t)
￿
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿￿￿t=￿t
￿t=￿t
:
When both ￿t and ￿t are ￿nite, we have Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
= Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
= 1 and Ft
￿
￿tj￿t;yt￿1￿
=
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
= 0, and the Lemma follows. If ￿t = ￿1, then as ￿t ! ￿1,
￿
￿G(￿t)
￿
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿￿
￿
￿ (jG(^ ￿t)j + Mj^ ￿tj)
￿
￿Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)
￿
￿
+ Mj￿tj
￿
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
+ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿
￿
￿
jG(^ ￿t)j + Mj^ ￿tj
￿￿ ￿Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿ ￿
+ M
￿Z
z￿￿t
jzjdFt
￿
zj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
+
Z
z￿￿t
jzjdFt
￿
zj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿
! 0
62by Assumptions 2 and 5. Similarly, if ￿t = +1; then as ￿t ! +1,
￿ ￿G(￿t)
￿
Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
jG(^ ￿t)j + Mj^ ￿tj
￿
jFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
j
+ Mj￿tj
￿￿
1 ￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿
+
￿
1 ￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿￿
￿
￿
jG(^ ￿t)j + Mj^ ￿tj
￿￿
￿Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿
￿
+ M
￿Z
z￿￿t
jzjdFt
￿
zj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
+
Z
z￿￿t
jzjdFt
￿
zj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿
! 0
by Assumptions 2 and 5.
For any function G : ￿ ! R, let
@￿G(￿)
@￿t
= limsup
￿0
t"￿t
G
￿
￿0
t;￿￿t
￿
￿ G(￿)
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
and
@+G(￿)
@￿t
= liminf
￿0
t#￿t
G
￿
￿0
t;￿￿t
￿
￿ G(￿)
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
:
The following Lemma is similar to Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) and Theorem 1 of Ely
(2001).
Lemma 7 In an ex ante IC mechanism ￿, for any integers 1 ￿ t ￿ ￿ and for ￿[￿]-almost all
histories
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
,
@￿V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
￿
@￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
and
@+V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
￿
@+￿￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
:
Proof. By ex ante IC we have for ￿[￿]-almost all histories
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
,
V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
= ￿￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿;y￿￿1￿
.
By de￿nition of V￿ and ￿￿, we have for all
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
and all ￿0
t,
V￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;￿￿;y￿￿1￿
:
Combining the two we have for ￿[￿]-almost all histories
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
and all ￿0
t,
V￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿ V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;￿￿;y￿￿1￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿;y￿￿1￿
.
Taking ￿0
t > ￿t, dividing by ￿0
t ￿ ￿t, and then taking liminf as ￿0
t # ￿t yields the second inequality
in the lemma. Taking ￿0
t < ￿t, dividing by ￿0
t ￿￿t, and then taking limsup as ￿0
t " ￿t yields the ￿rst
63inequality in the lemma.
The next two lemmas don￿ t rely on IC.
Lemma 8 For each t, ￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿
and Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿
are equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿t ￿
i.e., there exists M such that for all ￿t;￿t;mt;yt,
￿ ￿￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿
￿ ￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿￿ ￿ ￿ M
￿ ￿￿t ￿ ￿t￿ ￿;
￿ ￿Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿
￿ Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿￿ ￿ ￿ M
￿ ￿￿t ￿ ￿t￿ ￿:
Proof. By backward induction on t. ￿T+1
￿
￿T+1;mT+1;yT￿
= U
￿
￿T;yT￿
is equi-Lipschitz con-
tinuous in ￿T by Assumption 4. Now we show that for any t, if ￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿1￿
is equi-Lipschitz
continuous in ￿t, then Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
and ￿t￿1
￿
￿t￿1;mt￿1;yt￿2￿
are equi-Lipschitz continuous
in ￿t and ￿t￿1, respectively.
Indeed, suppose ￿t
￿
￿t;mt;yt￿1￿
is equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿t with a constant M. Then
￿ ￿Vt(￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1) ￿ Vt(￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1)
￿ ￿ ￿ sup
mt
￿ ￿￿t(￿t;(mt￿1;mt);yt￿1) ￿ ￿t(￿t;(mt￿1;mt);yt￿1)
￿ ￿
￿ M
￿
￿￿t ￿ ￿t￿
￿;
and so Vt is also equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿t. But then, using (31),
￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
￿t￿1;mt￿1;yt￿2￿
￿ ￿t￿1
￿
￿t￿1;mt￿1;yt￿2￿￿ ￿
￿ sup
yt￿1
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
Z
Vt
￿￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿
;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿
Z
Vt
￿￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿
;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ sup
yt￿1
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
Z ￿
Vt
￿￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿
;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Vt
￿￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿
;mt￿1;yt￿1￿￿
dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
+ sup
yt￿1
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
Z
Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿
Z
Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ sup
yt￿1
Z ￿ ￿Vt
￿￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿
;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Vt
￿￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿
;mt￿1;yt￿1￿￿ ￿dFt
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
+ sup
yt￿1
Z ￿ ￿Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
￿ Ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
@Vt
￿
￿t;mt￿1;yt￿1￿
@￿t
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
d￿t
￿ M
￿
￿￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1￿
￿
￿
1 +
Z
Bt (￿t)d￿t
￿
,
where we used Lemma 6 and Assumption 5. This shows that ￿t￿1 is equi-Lipschitz continuous in
￿t￿1.
64Lemma 9 For any integers ￿;t such that 1 ￿ t < ￿ ￿ T, and any
￿
￿￿￿1;m￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
;
@￿￿￿￿1
￿
￿￿￿1;m￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
@￿t
￿
Z
@￿V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
dF￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
(32)
￿
Z
@V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿￿
@F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
d￿￿d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
;
@+￿￿￿1
￿
￿￿￿1;m￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
@￿t
￿
Z
@+V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
dF￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
(33)
￿
Z
@V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿￿
@F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
d￿￿d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
:
Proof. Using (31), write for any ￿0
t 6= ￿t
￿￿￿1
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿￿1
￿t
￿
;m￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
￿ ￿￿￿1
￿
￿￿￿1;m￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
=
Z
V￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿ V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
dF￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
(34)
+
Z
V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
d
"
F￿
￿
￿￿j
￿
￿0
t;￿￿￿1
￿t
￿
;y￿￿1￿
￿ F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
#
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
(35)
+
Z
V￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿ V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
d
￿
F￿
￿
￿￿j
￿
￿0
t;￿￿￿1
￿t
￿
;y￿￿1￿
￿ F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿￿
￿
(36)
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
:
We examine separately the behavior of each of the three integrals as ￿0
t ! ￿t:
￿ (36): Note that for any y￿￿1;
Z
V￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿ V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
d
￿
F￿
￿
￿￿j
￿
￿0
t;￿￿￿1
￿t
￿
;y￿￿1￿
￿ F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿￿
! 0 as ￿0
t ! ￿t;
since the integrand is bounded by Lemma 8, and the total variation of the measure
d
￿
F￿
￿
￿￿j
￿
￿0
t;￿￿￿1
￿t
￿
;y￿￿1￿
￿ F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿￿
65converges to zero by Assumption 6. Thus, (36) is bounded in absolute value by a term that
converges to zero as ￿0
t ! ￿t:
(Note that in the Markov case, V￿
￿￿
￿0
t;￿￿
￿t
￿
;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
= Ut
￿
￿0
t;yt￿
￿
Ut
￿
￿t;yt￿
does not depend on ￿￿ so (36) equals zero without imposing Assumption 6.)
￿ (35): Using Lemma 8 and Lemma 6 it can be expressed as
￿
Z
F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1
￿t ;￿0
t;y￿￿1￿
￿ F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
@V￿
￿
￿￿;m￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿￿
d￿￿d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1jm￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
:
Using in addition Assumption 5, the Dominated Convergence Theorem establishes that as
￿0
t ! ￿t, the integral converges to the 2nd integral in (33) and (32).
￿ (34) Taking its limsup as ￿0
t " ￿t and using Fatou￿ s Lemma,37 we see that the limsup is
bounded above by the 1st integral in (32). Thus, we obtain (32). Similarly, taking the liminf
of (34) as ￿0
t # ￿t and using Fatou￿ s Lemma, we see that the liminf of this term is bounded
below by the 1st integral in (33), so we obtain (33).
Now combining the inequalities in Lemma 9 for m￿ = ￿￿ and the inequalities in Lemma 7 we
obtain for ￿[￿]-almost all histories
￿
￿￿￿1;￿￿￿2;y￿￿2￿
,
@￿V￿￿1
￿
￿￿￿1;￿￿￿2;y￿￿2￿
@￿t
￿
Z
@￿V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
dF￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1j￿￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
￿
Z
@V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿￿
@F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
d￿￿d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1j￿￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
;
@+V￿￿1
￿
￿￿￿1;￿￿￿2;y￿￿2￿
@￿t
￿
Z
@+V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
dF￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1j￿￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
￿
Z
@V￿
￿
￿￿;￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿￿
@F￿
￿
￿￿j￿￿￿1;y￿￿1￿
@￿t
d￿￿d￿￿￿1
￿
y￿￿1j￿￿￿1;y￿￿2￿
:
Furthermore, we have by de￿nition of VT+1,
@￿VT+1
￿
￿T+1;￿T;yT￿
@￿t
=
@+VT+1
￿
￿T+1;￿T;yT￿
@￿t
=
@VT+1
￿
￿T+1;￿T;yT￿
@￿t
=
@U
￿
￿T;yT￿
@￿t
:
So iterating the above inequalities forward for ￿ = t + 1;t + 2;:::;T + 1 yields for ￿[￿]-almost all
￿
￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
the double inequality
37Note that even though the integrand need not be nonnegative, it is bounded in absolute value by the lipschitz
constant M. Thus, in general we may have to add and subtract M from the integrand before applying Fatou￿ s lemma.
66@￿Vt
￿
￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
@￿t
￿
E￿[￿]j(￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1)
2
4
@U
￿
~ ￿
T
; ~ yT
￿
@￿t
￿
T X
￿=t+1
Z @V￿
￿￿
~ ￿
￿￿1
;￿￿
￿
;~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1
￿
@￿￿
@F￿
￿
￿￿j~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1
￿
@￿t
d￿￿
3
5
￿
@+Vt
￿
￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
@￿t
:
To complete the proof of the proposition, recall that by de￿nition,
Vt
￿
￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
= V ￿ ￿
￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
:
So by Lemma 8 V ￿ ￿
￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
is Lipschitz continuous in ￿t for all
￿
￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
. Thus, given
any
￿
￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
, the partial derivative
@V ￿(￿t;￿t￿1;yt￿1)
@￿t exists for almost every ￿t. Whenever
it does, it equals to both ends of the above double inequality and so (IC-FOC) obtains.
C Other Proofs Omitted in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 2. We proceed by backward induction. For t = T the claim follows
immediately from Proposition 1. Suppose now that it holds for all ￿ > t for some t 2 f1;:::;T ￿ 1g.
We will show that it holds also for t. Using iterated expectations and the induction hypothesis,
(IC-FOC) can be written as
@V ￿ ￿
￿t;ht￿1￿
@￿t
= E￿[￿]j(￿t;ht￿1)
"
@U(~ ￿; ~ y)
@￿t
+
T X
￿=t+1
I￿
t
￿
~ ￿
￿
; ~ y￿￿1
￿ @V ￿(~ ￿
￿
;~ ￿
￿￿1
; ~ y￿￿1)
@￿￿
#
= E￿[￿]j(￿t;ht￿1)
2
4@U(~ ￿; ~ y)
@￿t
+
T X
￿=t+1
I￿
t
￿
~ ￿
￿
; ~ y￿￿1
￿ T X
s=￿
Js
￿
￿
~ ￿
s
; ~ ys￿1
￿ @U
￿
~ ￿; ~ y
￿
@￿s
3
5
= E￿[￿]j(￿t;ht￿1)
2
4
T X
￿=t
J￿
t
￿
~ ￿
￿
; ~ y￿￿1
￿ @U
￿
~ ￿; ~ y
￿
@￿￿
3
5;
where the last equality follows by the de￿nition of J￿
t
￿
~ ￿
￿
; ~ y￿￿1
￿
.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Fix the history ^ ht￿1 and consider the auxiliary problem which consists of letting the agent
optimize his period-t report mt given history ^ ht￿1 and the period-t shock "t and then being forced
67to tell the truth at any subsequent period. Because ^ ￿ is IC at the truthful history ^ ht￿1,
^ V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1) = sup
mt2Et
E￿[^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 h
^ U(~ "; ~ y)
i
a.s.
The key is that, because of the independence of the shocks, the restriction of the measure ￿[^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1
on future shocks, current and future reports, and current and future decisions, i.e. on Et+1 ￿ ￿ ￿
ET ￿ Et ￿ ￿ ￿ ET ￿ Yt ￿ ￿ ￿ YT, does not depend on the true shock "t:38 Formally, let P(mt;^ ht￿1)
denote such restriction and ￿"t;^ ht￿1 denote the Dirac measure at ("t;^ ht￿1) over past and current
shocks, past reports, and past decisions, i.e. over E1 ￿ ￿ ￿ Et ￿ E1 ￿ ￿ ￿ Et￿1 ￿ Y1 ￿ ￿ ￿ Yt￿1: Then
the measure ￿[^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 on E ￿ E ￿ Y can be decomposed as
￿[^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 = ￿"t;^ ht￿1 ￿ P(mt;^ ht￿1):
By implication,
E￿[^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 h
^ U(~ "; ~ y)
i
= EP(mt;^ ht￿1)
h
^ U("t;~ "t+1;::;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;::; ~ yT)
i
:
Now, because for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y the function ^ U(￿;"￿t;y) is At-Lipschitz continuous, we
have that, for any "t;"0
t 2 Et any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y;
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
^ U(("t;"￿t);y) ￿ ^ U(("0
t;"￿t);y)
"t ￿ "0
t
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ At:
On the other hand, because P(mt;^ ht￿1) is a probability measure, EP(mt;^ ht￿1) [At] = At. Hence by
the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem,
lim
"0
t!"t
EP(mt;^ ht￿1)
h
^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT)
i
￿EP(mt;^ ht￿1)
h
^ U("t￿1;"0
t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT)
i
"t ￿ "0
t
= lim
"0
t!"t
EP(mt;^ ht￿1)
"
^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;::; ~ yT) ￿ ^ U("t￿1;"0
t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT)
"t ￿ "0
t
#
= EP(mt;^ ht￿1)
"
lim
"0
t!"t
^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT) ￿ ^ U("t￿1;"0
t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT)
"t ￿ "0
t
#
= EP(mt;^ ht￿1)
"
@ ^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT)
@"t
#
2 [￿At;At];
which implies that the objective function in the auxiliary problem is At-Lipschitz continuous and
38To be precise, it also does not depend on the true shocks experienced prior to period t; that is, it depends on the
history ^ h
t￿1 = ("
t￿1;"
t￿1;y
t￿1) only through the reported shocks and the past decisions.
68di⁄erentiable in "t.
The result then follows from the same arguments that establish Theorem 2 in Milgrom and
Segal (2002):39 the function ^ V
^ ￿(￿;^ ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous; furthermore, because Gt is strictly
increasing and because ^ ￿ is IC at ^ ht￿1; then mt = "t achieves the supremum for almost every "t
which implies that
@ ^ V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1)
@"t
= EP("t;^ ht￿1)
"
@ ^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT)
@"t
#
= E^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;^ ht￿1
"
@ ^ U(~ "; ~ y)
@"t
#
a.e. "t:
Proof of Proposition 5. For any ￿ and any ("￿;y￿) 2 E￿ ￿ Y ￿; let
^ u￿("￿;y￿) ￿ u￿(z￿("￿;y￿￿1);y￿);
so that
^ U(";y) ￿ U(z(";y);y) =
T X
￿=1
^ u￿("￿;y￿):
The result follows from combining the two lemmas below.
Lemma 10 Fix t: Suppose that, for any ￿ ￿ t; there exists a Dt;￿ 2 R+ such that (a) for
all ("￿
￿t;y￿) 2 E￿
￿t ￿ Y ￿; the function ^ u￿(￿;"￿
￿t;y￿) is Dt;￿-Lipschitz and di⁄erentiable, and (b)
PT
￿=t Dt;￿ < +1. Then there exists an At 2 R+ such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿Y; the function
^ U((￿;"￿t);y) is At-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable with
@ ^ U(("t;"￿t);y)
@"t
=
T X
￿=t
@^ u￿("￿;y￿)
@"t
:
39Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) establishes only that the value function is absolutely continuous; this
is because that theorem assumes that the payo⁄ is di⁄erentiable with an integrable bound instead of di⁄erentiable
and equi-Lipschitz continuous. It is however immediate to see that the same arguments that establish Theorem 2 in
Milgrom and Segal also establish that the value function is equi-Lipschitz continuous under the stronger assumptions
considered here.
69Proof of the Lemma. Under the assumptions of the Lemma we have that
lim
"0
t!"t
^ U(("t;"￿t;y) ￿ ^ U(("0
t;"￿t);y)
"t ￿ "0
t
= lim
"0
t!"t
T X
￿=t
^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿) ￿ ^ u￿(("0
t;"￿
￿t);y￿)
"t ￿ "0
t
=
T X
￿=t
lim
"0
t!"t
^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿) ￿ ^ u￿(("0
t;"￿
￿t);y￿)
"t ￿ "0
t
=
T X
￿=t
@^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿)
@"t
where the second equality is by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, since, for any
("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y; any "t;"0
t 2 Et;
T X
￿=t
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿) ￿ ^ u￿(("0
t;"￿
￿t);y￿)
"t ￿ "0
t
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
T X
￿=t
Dt;￿ < +1:
￿
Lemma 11 Suppose the assumptions in Proposition 5 hold. Then for all ￿ ￿ t there exists Dt;￿ 2
R+ such that (a) for all ("￿
￿t;y￿) 2 E￿
￿t ￿ Y ￿, ^ u￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿) : Et ! R is Dt;￿-Lipschitz continuous
and di⁄erentiable with
@^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿)
@"t
=
￿ X
l=t
@u￿(z￿("￿;y￿￿1);y￿)
@￿l
@zl("l;yl￿1)
@"t
;
and (b)
PT
￿=t Dt;￿ < +1.
Proof of the Lemma. Fix ("￿
￿t;y￿) 2 E￿
￿t ￿ Y ￿ and let z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! R denote the
vector-valued function de￿ned by
z￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) =
￿
zs("s;ys￿1)
￿￿
s=1 8"t 2 Et
Because each component function zs is di⁄erentiable in "t so is z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1). The function
^ u￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿) : Et ! R de￿ned by
^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿) ￿ u￿(z￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1);y￿) 8"t 2 Et
is thus the composition of two di⁄erentiable functions and hence, by the chain rule, it is itself
70di⁄erentiable and its derivative satis￿es the formula in the statement of the lemma. Furthermore,
￿
￿ ￿
￿
@^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿)
@"t
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ X
l=t
￿
￿ ￿
￿
@u￿(z￿("￿;y￿￿1);y￿)
@￿l
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
@zl("l;yl￿1)
@"t
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ B￿
￿ X
l=t
Ct;l ￿ B￿
T X
l=t
Ct;l:
Thus ^ u￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿) is Lipschitz continuous with constant Dt;￿ = B￿
PT
l=t Ct;l. Finally we have
T X
￿=t
Dt;￿ =
T X
￿=t
B￿
T X
l=t
Ct;l < +1:
￿
Proof of Proposition 6. Because of the result in Proposition 5, it su¢ ces to prove that assump-
tions 9 and 10 guarantee that the functions z obtained from the kernels F using the transformation
de￿ned in (8) satisfy the properties of Proposition 5.
Using (8), ￿rst note that when assumptions 9 and 10 hold, then for any t;￿; ￿ ￿ t; any
("￿
￿t;y￿￿1) 2 E￿
￿t ￿ Y ￿￿1; the function z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! ￿t de￿ned by
z￿(("￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) ￿ F￿1
￿ ("￿ j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;y￿￿1) 8"￿ 2 E￿
is di⁄erentiable and its derivatives satisfy
@z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1)
@"t
= ^ It
t("t;yt￿1) ^ J￿
t ("￿;￿￿￿1) 8￿ ￿ t
This follows directly from the chain rule for Frechet (and hence multivariate) di⁄erentiation.
Furthermore, using the de￿nitions of the ^ It
t and ^ J￿
t functions, it is immediate that, for any
("t;yt￿1) 2 Et ￿ Y t￿1; ￿
￿ ￿
￿
@zt("t;yt￿1)
@"t
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ Mt (37)
and, for any ￿ > t any ("￿;y￿￿1) 2 E￿ ￿ Y ￿￿1;
￿
￿ ￿
￿
@z￿("￿;y￿￿1)
@"t
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ Mt
8
> > <
> > :
D￿
2
6 6
41 +
X
l2N:t<l<￿
Dl +
X
K2N, l2NK+1:
t+1￿l0<:::<lK￿￿￿1
lK Y
l=l0
Dl
3
7 7
5
9
> > =
> > ;
(38)
From the ￿rst fundamental theorem of calculus, it then follows that, for any t;￿; ￿ ￿ t there exists a
Ct;￿ 2 R+ such that for all ("￿
￿t;y￿￿1) 2 E￿
￿t ￿Y ￿￿1; the function z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) is Ct;￿-Lipschitz
71continuous. The constant Ct;￿ can be taken to be equal to the RHS of (37) if ￿ = t and to the RHS
of (38) if ￿ > t. To prove the result, it then su¢ ces to show that, for any t;
Mt
8
> > <
> > :
1 +
T X
￿=t+1
D￿
2
6
6
41 +
X
l2N:t<l<￿
Dl +
X
K2N, l2NK+1:
t+1￿l0<:::<lK￿￿￿1
lK Y
l=l0
Dl
3
7
7
5
9
> > =
> > ;
< +1: (39)
This is immediate when T < +1: Thus consider the case T = +1: Because, for any period
￿ = 1;::;T; the expression in the square bracket in (39) is decreasing in t; the inequality in (39)
holds true for any arbitrary t > 1 if it holds true for t = 1: Because the latter property is true by
assumption 9, the result then follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. The initial steps of the proof are in the main text. Here we simply
prove that, under the assumptions in the proposition, the formula in (9) reduces to the one in (2).
Di⁄erentiating the identity40
Fs(F￿1
s ("sj￿s￿1;ys￿1)j￿s￿1;ys￿1) = "s:
with respect to ￿t, t < s; we have that for a.e. "s;
0 = fs(￿s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
￿
￿
￿s=F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1) ￿
@F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
@￿t
+
@Fs(￿s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
@￿t
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿s=F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
;
from which we obtain that
@F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys)
@￿t
= ￿
@Fs(￿s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
￿t
￿
￿ ￿
￿s=F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
fs(￿s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
￿
￿
￿s=F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
:
It follows that
^ Is
t ("s;ys￿1) ￿ ￿
@F￿1
s ("s j ￿s￿1;ys)
@￿t
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿s￿1=zs￿1("s￿1;ys￿2)
= ￿
@Fs(￿s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)=@￿t
fs(￿s j ￿s￿1;ys￿1)
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿s￿1=zs￿1("s￿1;ys￿2)
￿ Is
t (￿sj￿s￿1;ys￿1)
￿ ￿
￿s=zs("s;ys￿1)
:
40Note that the di⁄erentiability of Fs(￿sj￿
s￿1;y
s￿1) with respect to ￿t, t < s, follows from the assump-
tions in the proposition. This can be seen from the implicit function theorem applied to the identity
F
￿1
s (Fs(￿sj￿
s￿1;y
s￿1)j￿
s￿1;y
s￿1) = ￿s:
72and hence that
^ Js
t ("s;ys￿1) = Js
t (zs("s;ys￿1);ys￿1):
By the de￿nition of independent-shock representation, we then have that
@V ￿(zt("t;yt￿1);zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2);yt￿1)
@￿t
=
E
^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;"t￿1;yt￿1
"
T X
￿=t
J￿
t (z￿(~ "￿;y￿￿1);y￿￿1)
@U(zT(~ "T; e yT￿1); e yT)
@￿￿
#
= E￿[￿]jzt("t;yt￿1);zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2);yt￿1
"
T X
￿=t
J￿
t (~ ￿
￿
;y￿￿1)
@U(~ ￿; e y)
@￿￿
#
;
which is the same formula as in (2).
Proof of Proposition 8.
By (iii), it su¢ ces to consider only single-stage deviations in period t, i.e., deviations to some
report mt followed by truthtelling from t + 1 onward. Thus, it su¢ ces to verify that the agent￿ s
period-t payo⁄ expectation from such a deviation at any truthful history
￿
￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
and at
any current type ￿t, which is given by
￿(￿t;mt;￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ E￿[￿]jj(￿t￿1;￿t);(￿t￿1;mt);yt￿1
[U(~ y;~ ￿)];
is maximized by reporting mt = ￿t. For this purpose, the following lemma is useful. (A similar
approach has been applied to static mechanism design with one-dimensional type and multidimen-
sional decisions but under stronger assumptions￿ see Garcia, 2005.)
Lemma 12 Consider a function ￿ : (￿;￿)2 ! R. Suppose that (a) ￿(￿;m) is Lipschitz continuous
in ￿ for all m, (b) ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;￿) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿, and (c) for any m, for a.e. ￿,
(￿0 (￿) ￿ @￿(￿;m)=@￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ m) ￿ 0. Then ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;m) for all (￿;m).
Proof of the Lemma: Let g(￿;m) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;m). For any ￿xed m, g(￿;m) is Lipschitz
continuous in ￿ by (a) and (b). Hence, it is di⁄erentiable a.e. in ￿, and
g(￿;m) =
Z ￿
m
@g(z;m)
@￿
dz =
Z ￿
m
￿
￿0 (z) ￿
@￿(z;m)
@￿
￿
dz:
By (c), the integrand is nonnegative for a.e. z ￿ m and nonpositive for a.e. z ￿ m. Therefore,
g(￿;m) ￿ 0 for both ￿ ￿ m and ￿ < m. ￿
Now, to apply the Lemma, we interpret ￿(￿t;mt;￿t￿1;yt￿1) as the agent￿ s expected utility
from truthtelling in the mechanism ^ ￿ constructed from ￿ by ignoring the agent￿ s report in pe-
73riod t and substituting mt instead. Assumption (iii) means that the mechanism ^ ￿ is IC at
any history in period t, and therefore ￿(￿t;mt;￿t￿1;yt￿1) is the agent￿ s value function in the
mechanism. Applying to ^ ￿ the result in Proposition 2, or equivalently in Proposition 7, we have
that, for any mt, ￿(￿t;mt;￿t￿1;yt￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿t and @￿(￿t;mt;￿t￿1;yt￿1)=@￿t =
D￿ ￿
￿t;
￿
￿t￿1;mt
￿
;yt￿1￿
a.e. ￿t. The former property establishes assumption (a) in the Lemma.
Assumption (i) in the proposition establishes assumption (b) in the Lemma and, together with
assumption (ii) in the proposition, it establishes assumption (c) in the Lemma. The Lemma then
implies that ￿(￿t;mt;￿t￿1;yt￿1) is indeed maximized by reporting mt = ￿t which implies that ￿ is
IC at any truthful period-t history.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let ￿i[￿; ] and ￿i[￿; ^  ] denote the randomized direct mechanisms that
agent i faces respectively under h￿; i and
D
￿; ^  
E
, as de￿ned in the main text. Let V ￿i[￿; ] : Hi ! R
and V ￿i[￿;^  ] : Hi ! R denote the corresponding value functions.
We ￿rst establish the following result.
Lemma 13 Suppose the assumptions in Proposition 9 hold. Then, for ￿[￿]￿ almost all truthful
private histories ht￿1
i = (￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i (￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
￿i )); there exists a scalar Kit(ht￿1
i ) such that
V ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿it;ht￿1
i
￿
￿ V ￿i[￿;^  ] ￿
￿it;ht￿1
i
￿
= Kit(ht￿1
i ) for all ￿it: (40)
Proof of the Lemma. From Lemma 1, the fact that h￿; i and
D
￿; ^  
E
are ex-ante BIC implies
that they are BIC at ￿T
i [￿]-almost all truthful private histories ht￿1
i ￿ (￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i (￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
￿i )),
for any i and any t ￿ 1. Iterating (IC-FOC) backward (or alternatively using (9)) and (11)), then
implies that, under quasi-linearity, for any t ￿ 1 and ￿T
i [￿]￿ almost all truthful private histories
ht￿1
i ; the value functions V ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿;ht￿1
i
￿
and V ￿i[￿;^  ] ￿
￿;ht￿1
i
￿
are Lipschitz continuous in ￿it and
@V ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿it;ht￿1
i
￿
@￿it
=
@V ￿i[￿;^  ] ￿
￿it;ht￿1
i
￿
@￿it
a.e. ￿it:
This also implies that for ￿[￿]￿ almost all truthful private histories ht￿1
i , there exists a scalar
Kit(ht￿1
i ) such that the condition in (40) holds. ￿
The result for t = 1 then follows directly from this lemma by letting Ki = Ki1(h0), where h0 is
the null history, and noting that, in any ex-ante BIC mechanism, the value function coincides with
the expected payo⁄ under truthtelling with probability one.
The proof for the second result in the proposition is by induction. Suppose there exists a Ki 2 R
such that
E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿i￿;~ h￿￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
￿
i ] ￿ E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿i￿;~ h￿￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
￿
i ] = Ki (41)
74when ￿ = t ￿ 1: We then show that (41) holds also ￿ = t + 1:
First note that for ￿[￿]￿ almost all private histories (￿it;ht￿1
i );
V ￿i[￿; ] ￿
￿it;ht￿1
i
￿
= E￿T
i [￿]j￿it;ht￿1
i [V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿it+1;~ ht
i
￿
]:
By the law of iterated expectations, we then have that
E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿it;~ ht￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i] = E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i]
It follows that
E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿it;~ ht￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i] ￿ E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿it;~ ht￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i]
= E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i] ￿ E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i]
= E￿[￿][V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
￿ V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i]
= E￿[￿][Ki;t+1
￿
~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i];
(42)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 13.
Now note that, when assumption DNOT holds, the stochastic process ￿[￿] over ￿ does not
depend on ￿: Because any truthful private history ~ ht
i is then a deterministic function of ~ ￿
t
i and ~ ￿
t
￿i
and because types are independent we then have that
E￿[Ki;t+1
￿
~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i] = E￿[Ki;t+1
￿
~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t+1
i ] (43)
= E￿[V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t+1
i ] ￿ E￿[V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t+1
i ],
where the last equality follows again from Lemma 13. Combining (42) with (43) then gives
E￿[V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t+1
i ] ￿ E￿[V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿i;t+1;~ ht
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t+1
i ]
= E￿[￿]j[V ￿i[￿; ]
￿
~ ￿it;~ ht￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i] ￿ E￿[￿]j[V ￿i[￿;^  ]
￿
~ ￿it;~ ht￿1
i
￿
j ~ ￿
t
i]
Using again the fact that the value function coincides with the equilibrium payo⁄ with probability
one then gives the result.
Finally note that, when N = 1; ~ ht
1 is a deterministic function of ~ ￿
t
1 only. The result in (43)
is thus always true when the allocation rule is deterministic. We conclude that, when N = 1; the
result in the second part of the proposition holds even if assumption DNOT is dispensed with.
Proof of Proposition 15. The proof is in two parts. Part (1) proves that any handicapped
cut-o⁄rule ￿ is implementable in a mechanism that is IC at all histories. Part (2) proves that there
75exists a handicapped cuto⁄ rule that solves the relaxed problem.
Part (1). The proof is by backward induction. We ￿rst note that given any history (￿T￿1;mT￿1),
￿T(mT￿1;￿) is monotone and hence implementable in a mechanism that is IC at any period-T
history. Suppose then that ￿ is implementable in a mechanism that is IC at any period t + 1
history for some t ￿ T ￿ 1. By Proposition 13, we then have that, if for all (￿t;(￿t￿1;mt)),41
D[￿](￿t;(￿t￿1;mt)) = E￿j￿t
"
T X
￿=t
￿￿￿t￿￿(￿t￿1;mt;~ ￿t+1;:::;~ ￿￿)
#
is nondecreasing in mt, then ￿ is implementable in a mechanism that is IC at all truthful period t
histories (and all period t + 1 histories). This property in turn follows from the fact that, for any
realization (￿t+1;:::;￿T),
T X
￿=t
￿￿￿t￿￿(￿t￿1;mt;￿t+1;:::;￿￿)
is nondecreasing in mt: Increasing mt thus either has no e⁄ect on the allocation of the good, or it
permits the agent to get the good sooner. (Note that for t = 1 this uses the assumption that zt(m1)
are nonincreasing in m1) Since ￿ ￿ 1, getting the good sooner (weakly) increases the value of
D[￿](￿t;(￿t￿1;mt)). Thus ￿ is implementable at all truthful histories. Given that the environment
is Markov, it is then implementable at all period t histories. This proves the induction which then
establishes the claim.
Part (2). By inspection of the formula for the dynamic virtual surplus, it is immediate that
if xt = 1 for some t, then it is optimal to set x￿ = 0 for all ￿ > t. Hence the allocation rule
that maximizes the dynamic virtual surplus can be obtained as the solution to an optimal stopping
problem. Let vt be the value function from continuing to period t (i.e. from arriving to period
t without having sold the good in previous periods). Because of the Markov structure of the
environment, it is straightforward to verify, by backward induction, that each vt is independent of
(￿2;:::;￿t￿1). The value functions thus satisfy the functional equations
vt(￿1;￿t) = max
n
￿t ￿ c ￿ ￿t￿1￿￿1
1 (￿1); E￿j￿t h
vt+1(￿1;~ ￿t+1)
io
; (44)
where vT+1 ￿ 0. We start by listing some useful properties of vt.
Lemma 14 (i) For all t, vt is nondecreasing.
(ii) For all t > 1, all ￿0
1 > ￿1, and all ￿t,
vt(￿0
1;￿t) ￿ vt(￿1;￿t) ￿ ￿t￿1(￿￿1
1 (￿1) ￿ ￿￿1
1 (￿0
1)):
41In this example, decisions do not a⁄ect types; we thus suppressed x
t￿1 from the argument of D
[￿] and replaced
￿
T[￿] with ￿:
76(iii) For all t > 1, all ￿0
t > ￿t, and all ￿1,
vt(￿1;￿0
t) ￿ vt(￿1;￿t) ￿ ￿0
t ￿ ￿t:
Proof of the Lemma. We prove each assertion by backward induction.
(i) For t = T we have
vT(￿1;￿T) = max
￿
￿T ￿ c ￿ ￿T￿1￿￿1
1 (￿1); 0
￿
:
Since ￿￿1
1 (￿1) is nonincreasing by assumption, vT is nondecreasing in both arguments. Suppose
then that the claim is true for some t ￿ T. By inspection of (44) vt￿1 is then the maximum of two
nondecreasing functions and hence itself nondecreasing.
(ii) vT clearly satis￿es the property. Suppose this is true of vt+1 for some 2 ￿ t ￿ T￿1. Consider
vt. Fix ￿t. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (44) increases by ￿t￿1(￿￿1
1 (￿1) ￿ ￿￿1
1 (￿0
1)) as
one moves from ￿1 to ￿0
1. The second term increases by
E￿j￿t h
vt+1(￿0
1;~ ￿t+1) ￿ vt+1(￿1;~ ￿t+1)
i
=
Z ￿
vt+1(￿0
1;￿￿t + "t+1) ￿ vt+1(￿1;￿￿t + "t+1)
￿
dGt+1("t+1)
￿
Z
￿t(￿￿1
1 (￿1) ￿ ￿￿1
1 (￿0
1))dGt+1("t+1)
￿ ￿t￿1(￿￿1
1 (￿1) ￿ ￿￿1
1 (￿0
1));
where the ￿rst inequality follows by the induction hypothesis while the second by ￿ ￿ 1. Thus
vt(￿;￿t) is the maximum of two increasing functions, each of which increases by at most ￿t￿1(￿￿1
1 (￿1)￿
￿￿1
1 (￿0
1)) as ￿1 ! ￿0
1. This implies the claim.
(iii) vT clearly satis￿es the property. Suppose this is true of vt+1 for some 2 ￿ t ￿ T ￿ 1.
Consider vt. Fix ￿1. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (44) increases by ￿0
t ￿ ￿t as ￿t ! ￿0
t.
The second term increases by
Z ￿
vt+1(￿1;￿￿0
t + "t+1) ￿ vt+1(￿1;￿￿t + "t+1)
￿
dGt+1("t+1)
￿
Z
￿
￿
￿0
t ￿ ￿t
￿
dGt+1("t+1)
￿ ￿0
t ￿ ￿t;
where the ￿rst inequality follows by the induction hypothesis, and the second by ￿ ￿ 1. Thus
vt(￿1;￿) is the maximum of two increasing functions, each of which increases by at most ￿0
t ￿ ￿t as
77￿t ! ￿0
t. This implies the claim and completes the proof of the Lemma. ￿
We now show that the solution to the relaxed program takes the form of a handicapped cut-o⁄
rule. Consider period t > 1. By inspection of the functional equation (44) we see that conditional
on the good not being sold before period t, only the ￿rst-period type ￿1 and the current-period
type ￿t matter for the period-t decision (recall that ￿t follows a Markov, process). Fix ￿1. As
￿t ! ￿0
t > ￿t, the ￿rst term on the right-hand side grows by ￿0
t ￿ ￿t. By (the proof of) part (iii)
of Lemma 14 the second term grows at most by ￿0
t ￿ ￿t. At ￿t = 0 the ￿rst term is negative,
whereas the second term is always nonnegative as one feasible continuation strategy is to never sell.
Thus there exists a cut-o⁄ zt(￿1) 2 R [ f+1g such that the good is sold in period t if and only
if ￿t ￿ zt(￿1). It remains to show that the cut o⁄ zt is nonincreasing in ￿1: This follows from the
fact that the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (44) grows by ￿t￿1(￿￿1
1 (￿1)￿￿￿1
1 (￿0
1)) as ￿1 ! ￿0
1,
whereas the second grows at most by ￿t￿1(￿￿1
1 (￿1) ￿ ￿￿1
1 (￿0
1)) by part (ii) of Lemma 14. Thus
increasing ￿1 given any ￿xed ￿t makes the ￿rst term increase relative to the second. This proves
that the cuto⁄ zt(￿1) is nonincreasing.
Finally, consider t = 1. As ￿1 ! ￿0
1 > ￿1, the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (44) increases
by ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿￿1
1 (￿1) ￿ ￿￿1
1 (￿0
1) ￿ ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1. For the change in the second term we have an upper
bound
Z ￿
v2(￿0
1;￿￿0
1 + "2) ￿ v2(￿1;￿￿1 + "2)
￿
dG2("2)
￿
Z
￿
￿
￿0
1 ￿ ￿1
￿
dG2("2)
￿ ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1;
where the ￿rst inequality follows by part (iii) of Lemma 14 while the second by ￿ ￿ 1. Thus the
￿rst term grows everywhere (weakly) faster than the second. Hence there exists a cuto⁄ z1 2 cl￿1
such that it is optimal to sell the good in period one if and only if ￿1 ￿ z1. (Note that included
are also the special cases where the good is either sold in period 1 to all ￿1, or it is not sold to any
￿1.)
Proof of Proposition 17. We show that, under conditions (1)￿ (4), any allocation rule that is
part of a pro￿t-maximizing mechanism must maximize the expected dynamic virtual surplus.
First note that, by Proposition 12, assumption (2) and (4) guarantee that the participation
constraints for all types other than the lowest ones can be ignored.
Next note that, because the environment satis￿es assumption USEP (i.e. payo⁄s are time-
separable), then an allocation rule maximizes the expected dynamic virtual surplus if and only if,
for all t ￿-almost all ￿t, ￿t(￿) satis￿es condition (27) in the proposition. To prove the result it thus
78su¢ ces to show that any allocation rule that satis￿es condition (27) is implementable in an OEP-IC
mechanism that gives zero expected surplus to the lowest types. The result in Proposition 10 then
implies that any allocation rule that is part of a pro￿t-maximizing mechanism must necessarily
maximize the expected dynamic virtual surplus.
As a preliminary step, note that, by inspection, the period-t allocation depends only on the
current types ￿t and the ￿rst period types ￿1. Assumptions (1), (3) and (4) then imply that the
period-t-state-￿t virtual surplus has increasing di⁄erences in (￿i1;xit) and in (￿it;xit) (for any ￿xed
values of the other arguments). Thus any allocation rule that maximizes the expected dynamic
virtual surplus has the property that ￿it(￿) is increasing in ￿t
i (in the product order) implying that
￿ is strongly monotone.
Assume now that all agents other than i are truthful. Suppose further that at each pe-
riod t, before sending his message mit, agent i has observed (￿t
i;￿T
￿i;mt￿1
i ;xt￿1) (because the
other agents are assumed to be truthful we omit the speci￿cation of the other agents￿ mes-
sages.) Now consider the allocation rule ￿i(￿;￿T
￿i) that is obtained from ￿ by ￿xing the type
pro￿le for all agents other than i to ￿T
￿i: For all ￿T
￿i, we ￿rst construct payments of the form
 i(mT
i ;￿T
￿i) =
PT
t=2  it(mi1;mit;￿￿i;1;￿￿i;t) that make truthtelling optimal for agent i in all peri-
ods t ￿ 2 and for any period t history. Thus consider an arbitrary period t ￿ 2. Because at any
period ￿ > t both ￿i￿(￿;￿T
￿i) and  i￿(￿) do not depend on agent i￿ s message mit in period t and be-
cause assumptions DNOT, USEP, and PDPD hold in this environment, then the agent￿ s incentives
separate over time. That is, the choice of the optimal message mit depends on (￿t
i;￿T
￿i;mt￿1
i ;xt￿1)
only through (￿it;mi1;￿￿i;1;￿￿i;t). Or, equivalently, agent i￿ s period-t problem is a static problem
indexed by (mi1;￿￿i;1;￿￿i;t). Now think of ￿it(￿;mi1;￿￿i;1;￿￿i;t) as a static allocation rule indexed
by (mi1;￿￿i;1;￿￿i;t). By strong monotonicity this allocation rule is nondecreasing in mit. Standard
results from static mechanism design then guarantee that, when assumption (1) holds, for each
(mi1;￿￿i;1;￿￿i;t) ￿ k; truthtelling can be made optimal for agent i using payments of the form
 it(￿it;k) ￿ uit(￿it;￿it(￿it;k)) ￿
Z ￿it
￿it
@uit(r;￿it(r;k))
@￿it
dr:
Repeating these steps for each period t ￿ 2 and each agent i, then gives a mechanism h￿; i, where
  is as constructed above, that is OEP-IC at any period-t history, for any t ￿ 2:
Next, consider period 1. We proved above that there exists a mechanism h￿; i that is OEP-IC
at any (possibly non-truthful) period t ￿ 2 history. Because assumptions DNOT, FOSD, SCP and
PDPD hold in this environment, and because ￿ is strongly monotone, then Corollary 1 implies that
there exists a payment rule ^   such that h￿; i is OEP-IC at any history. The construction of the
payments then follows from the proof of that corollary.
79Proof of Lemma 5. Fix an arbitrary history ￿ 2 ￿ and let t be the ￿rst period such that
￿t(￿t) = 0. Then let s > t be the ￿rst period after t such that ￿s(￿s) = 1. Because there is no
learning in periods t + 1;:::;s, the last s ￿ t components of ￿s are necessarily equal to ￿t, the last
component of ￿t (that is, ￿￿ = ￿t for ￿ = t;t+1;:::;s). Now consider an allocation rule ^ ￿ such that
(1) ^ ￿t(￿t) = ￿s(￿s) = 1, (2) for any successor ￿￿ to ￿t, the behavior of ^ ￿￿ is de￿ned by the behavior
of ￿s+(￿￿t) for the analogous successor ￿s+(￿￿t) to ￿s, with ^ ￿￿ ￿ 0 if s + (￿ ￿ t) > T, and (3) ^ ￿
agrees with ￿ elsewhere. Next let ^   be the payment scheme that is obtained from   following the
same construction as for ^ ￿:
Now note that, because there is no learning during periods of no sales and because there is
no discounting, the mechanism
D
^ ￿; ^  
E
leads to the same payo⁄s as h￿; i. Repeating the above
construction for all possible histories ￿ 2 ￿ gives rise to an IR-BIC mechanism
D
^ ￿; ^  
E
such that ^ ￿
is a stopping rule and the expected payo⁄s of both the buyer and the seller under
D
^ ￿; ^  
E
are the
same as under h￿; i.
Proof of Proposition 16. Part (1). Consider the e¢ cient allocation rule ￿￿. It solves a stopping
problem where the period t payo⁄ is xt (￿t ￿ c) with ￿t distributed as above. Let v￿
t(￿t) denote
the continuation value from period t onwards, which depends only on the current type given the
Markov structure. We have
v￿
t(￿t) = max
n
0;￿t ￿ c + E
h
v￿
t+1(~ ￿t+1)j￿t
io
: (45)
(We are using the conditional expectation notation for convenience; the expectation is actually
taken with respect to the kernel identi￿ed above.) We proceed by backward induction. At T, for
any ￿, the e¢ cient allocation ￿￿
T(￿) solves
v￿
T(￿T) = maxf0;￿T ￿ cg:
Thus ￿￿
T has cut-o⁄ z￿
T = c, which is independent of ￿T￿1; by implication, v￿
T is nondecreasing.
Suppose then that the properties identi￿ed for period T are true for some period t + 1 (That is,
￿￿
t+1 has cut-o⁄ z￿
t+1 independent of ￿t and v￿
t+1 is nondecreasing). We want to show that the same
properties hold in period t.
Given ￿t, ￿￿
t(￿t) solves the maximization problem in (45). Since v￿
t+1 is nondecreasing by
the induction hypothesis and we have FOSD, ￿￿
t has a cuto⁄ z￿
t which does not depend on ￿t￿1.
Furthermore, v￿
t is nondecreasing.
We conclude that the e¢ cient rule is a cuto⁄rule where the cuto⁄s depend only on t. It remains
to show that the cuto⁄s z￿
t are nondecreasing in t. By inspection of (45) it su¢ ces to show that
80v￿
t is nonincreasing in t. To this end we ￿rst establish by backward induction that the functions v￿
t
are convex. This is clearly true of v￿
T. Suppose then that v￿
t+1 is convex. Note that the kernels Ft
identi￿ed above imply that ￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿t, where ~ ￿t ￿ N(0;￿2
t+1). Note that the distribution of ~ ￿t
is independent of ￿t. Thus for any ￿t, ￿0
t and ￿ 2 [0;1] we have
v￿
t(￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
t) = max
n
0;￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
t ￿ c + E
h
v￿
t+1(~ ￿t+1)j￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
t
io
= max
￿
0;￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
t ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
t + ~ ￿t)
￿￿
= max
￿
0;￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
t ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(￿(￿t + ~ ￿t) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿0
t + ~ ￿t))
￿￿
￿ max
￿
0;￿
￿
￿t ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(￿t + ~ ￿t)
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿0
t ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(￿0
t + ~ ￿t)
￿￿￿
￿ ￿max
￿
0;￿t ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(￿t + ~ ￿t)
￿￿
+(1 ￿ ￿)max
￿
0;￿0
t ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(￿0
t + ~ ￿t)
￿￿
= ￿v￿
t(￿t) + (1 ￿ ￿)v￿
t(￿0
t):
Thus v￿
t is convex. Suppose then that for some t, v￿
t ￿ v￿
￿ for all ￿ ￿ t. Note that this holds
vacuously for t = T. Consider period t ￿ 1. For any a 2 R,
v￿
t￿1(a) = maxf0;a ￿ c + E[v￿
t(a + ~ ￿t)]g
￿ max
￿
0;a ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(a + ~ ￿t)
￿￿
￿ max
￿
0;a ￿ c + E
￿
v￿
t+1(a + ~ ￿t+1)
￿￿
= v￿
t(a);
where the ￿rst equality follows by the induction hypothesis and the second by the convexity of
v￿
t+1, since the distribution of ~ ￿t+1 second order stochastically dominates that of ~ ￿t.
Part (2). Next, consider the Relaxed Program. Let vt(￿t) denote the continuation value from
period t onwards. We have
vt(￿t) = max
￿
0;￿t ￿ c ￿
1
￿1(￿1)
+ E
￿
vt+1(￿t+1)j￿t￿￿
: (46)
By backward induction one sees that vt(￿t) depends only on (￿1;￿t). Thus the allocation rule ￿
that solves the Relaxed Program is an e¢ cient rule in the model parameterized by ￿1 where the
seller￿ s cost is c￿ 1
￿1(￿1). The result in part (1) then implies that ￿ is a cuto⁄rule, where the cuto⁄s
zt(￿1) depend only on t and the parameter ￿1, and are nondecreasing in t. Since the hazard rate
￿1(￿1) is assumed to be monotone, the second term on the right hand side is nondecreasing in ￿1.
This implies that zt(￿1) is nonincreasing in ￿1.
Part (3). We prove the result by verifying the conditions of Proposition 11. Super- and sub-
modularity (respectively of ui (￿;x) and of @ui (￿;x)=@￿it) are satis￿ed since the payo⁄s are time-
81separable and the ￿ ow payo⁄s are linear. By inspection so is SCP. We also have FOSD since ￿t
follows a nonstationary random walk. DNOT obtains since given the restriction to stopping rules,
for any nontrivial history (i.e., where selling hasn￿ t yet stopped) the distributions depend only on
t. Finally, the set of stopping rules is seen to be a lattice as follows: De￿ne the pointwise order on
X S by setting ￿ ￿ ￿0 if for all t, all ￿t, ￿t(￿t) ￿ ￿0
t(￿t). It is then straightforward to verify that
the meet and the join of any two stopping rules are stopping rules. The result then follows from
Proposition 11.
Part (4). Implementability of each of the two rules follows from Proposition 12 and Corollary
1 since both rules are clearly strongly monotone. Other assumptions are veri￿ed as in the proof of
part (3).
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